



IRAQ'S POWER PLAY
Special Report



Newsweek


August 12, 1990 \$5.50

Baghdad's Bully

**Can He Be
Stopped?**

**The War
of the
Future**

**Oil Shocks
Ahead**



Saddam Hussein

PE/GW/UW-01

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PE/GU

it is working" ("The New Teacher", *Education*, July 16). I am currently enrolled in a traditional four-year teacher education program, and I have observed negative effects of hiring alternatively trained teachers. The most noticeable result is the demoralization of professional school teachers. Those of us who studied long and hard to become educators resent the dilettantes who want to be professors for two or three years landing a job at twice a public school salary. In my own student-teaching experience, I relied upon the invaluable advice of experienced men and women who have been teachers for 20 or 20 years and are committed to the profession. Relying upon alternatively trained teachers may be a short-term solution to the shortage, but in the long run it leaves our public schools of experienced and professional educators. The solution to the shortage of teachers is to raise standards for the profession and increase salaries to make it more competitive with the other professions, which currently attract many of our brightest and most talented college graduates.

DANIEL NEISES
Topeka, Kans.

...
I believe I am qualified to teach science for the... of alternative training... Many educators are... their turf and building... of their students... teaching system should... focus on the class... process. Innovative... Teach For America will... direction to the profes... educators to focus their... toward the student... where they are most... and appreciated. I ap... alternative training... advocated by Wendy... her. Keep up the good

ARTHUR W. BENDER
Professor of Microbiology
College of the Desert
Palm Desert, Calif.

...not the "new" and... movement... believe. Back in... established the... similar in many... and VISTA pro... graduates from a... the Teacher Corps... the shortage of... areas, both

12, 1990

innercity and rural. This two-year training program provided its interns with education methods and other classes as well as immediate on-the-job training experience, culminating in a Master of Arts in Teaching degree. I participated in the Teacher Corps from 1968 to 1970 and am still teaching today. I'm glad to know that there is once again a similar program to attract bright college grads.

CAROL POTTUJOHN
Deming, N.M.

S&L Shenanigans

"The S&L Firestorm" (*NATIONAL AFFAIRS*, July 23) provides statistics on indictments, convictions and cumulative years of punishment for the S&L crooks. However, it overlooks the most important penalty of all: the fines to be collected by the Justice Department. These crooks, after all, are the ones responsible for the mess with their high-risk, high-profit shenanigans. We should strip them of all of their assets—rather than forcing the taxpayers to pay for their upkeep in jail. This kind of "restitution" would help pay for the S&L crisis and save taxpayers a lot of money. Our government should send the message that white-collar crime doesn't pay.

MARK FRANKEL
Somerset, N.J.

...
Neil Bush, having been born and raised in the most powerful political family in the country today, cannot get away with pleading innocent due to ignorance of conflict-of-interest ethics. Indeed, by virtue of his background and familial obligation to keep his nose clean, he should have been hypersensitive to the issue—more so than any other S&L director in the nation. What I find most galling are his attempts to evade accountability for his behavior. I feel the Office of Thrift Supervision has been far too lenient and I'm glad that Bush's efforts to evade accountability may only worsen his predicament.

GAIL WILHELM
Novato, Calif.

...
In calling for an independent counsel to investigate Neil Bush, Rep. Patricia Schroeder has raised a Washington art form to a new level. Her talent for political opportunism is not only cruel, it's a waste of time and money. Neil Bush is a minor character in a drama that has been playing out for years. President Bush has promised not to interfere with the legal system—clearing the way for a full and fair investigation of his son. Several members of Congress, meanwhile, have come under fire for blocking legislation that would have placed greater controls on the S&L industry in

exchange for campaign contributions from thrift operators. Instead of hunting headlines, Schroeder should follow the president's lead and get her own House in order.

MARY DARLING
Washington, D.C.

...
How could you possibly put quotation marks around the word "loan," when referring to the "incredibly sweet deal" Neil Bush received? A "loan" for \$100,000 which he had to repay only if the investment made money sounds more like a "gift" to me. A lot of us peons who are going to have to pay for the S&L fiasco over the next 40 years would like to be cut in on deals like this!

LINDA AGAR-HENDRIX
Ijamsville, Md.

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
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
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NEWSWEEK WAS NAMED THE "BEST MAGAZINE FOR POLITICAL COVERAGE" BY THE WASHINGTON JOURNALISM REVIEW, FEBRUARY, 1989.



Baghdad's Bully

With a stunning invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein terrified his neighbors and triggered new oil jitters. Stopping him is possible, but far from easy.



We swear . . . that we will make the gulf a graveyard for all those who think of committing aggression, starting with these cowardly American Navies.

—Baghdad Radio

Strongman: Iraq's dictator and a tank in action against Iran

PAVLOVSKY—BYOMA; ROBERT—BIPA

IRAQ'S POWER PLAY

It was Saddam Hussein's easiest conquest. At 2 a.m. last Thursday, with the torrid desert air as cool as it was going to get, hundreds of Iraqi tanks rolled across the border into the rich but tiny emirate of Kuwait. Soon they were

rumbling down a six-lane highway toward the thinly defended opulence of Kuwait city. Fighting flared in places, most fiercely

at the royal palace, where the ruler's brother was said to have died resisting the invaders. The emir himself fled by helicopter to neighboring Saudi Arabia, and soon Kuwaiti forces were overwhelmed by the vanguard of Saddam Hussein's battle-hardened, million-strong Army. With Kuwait at his feet, Saddam, as he is known throughout the Middle East, warned that he would make the region "a graveyard" for anyone who tried to oppose him.


Saddam is a tyrant and a bully and no friend of the West. Stopping him is feasible,

but not easy. His stunning move into Kuwait destabilized the Middle East—cowing the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, diminishing the stature of moderates such as Egypt and increasing the military threat to Israel (page 26). In one stroke, the invasion made Saddam the strongest leader in the Arab world and the most potent force in the global oil market. Oil prices rose sharply, and stock markets shuddered (page 29). Last Friday the Iraqis said they had set up a "provisional free government" in Kuwait and would start to withdraw their troops on



A Worried World Feels the Heat

The Middle East is a political ecosystem: to push a button in Baghdad is to get a reaction in Riyadh. The Iraqi invasion, Arab pride, oil prices, the Palestinian problem and the fate of the hostages are all related. A rundown of who needs what:



ALAIN NOGUES—SYGMA
Jordan's Hussein



ALAIN NOGUES—SYGMA
Syria's Assad



SHARAF KAY TEL-AVIV
Egypt's Mubarak



SHARAF KAY TEL-AVIV
Saudi's Fahd

Iraq

Money and ambition lay behind the Iraqi invasion. The long Persian Gulf war bled Iraq's economy; Kuwait resisted an oil-price hike to refill Iraq's treasury, then refused a demand for compensation. The ambition: Saddam Hussein seeks recognition as the pre-eminent Pan-Arab leader.

Saudi Arabia

The pro-Western but congenitally cautious Saudis control a major pipeline for Iraqi oil. Saudi Arabia is a dominant force in OPEC, but is no military match for Iraq.

The Gulf States

The small oil countries of the gulf—Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—

felt the squeeze. Iraq blamed the U.A.E. along with Kuwait for deflating oil prices.

Israel

The invasion stole attention from the Palestinian problem, but no Mideast country had as much to lose from Saddam's long-term Pan-Arab ambitions. Israel has always been helped by Arab disunity.

Jordan

Jordan still smarts from its loss of Jerusalem in the 1967 war. As a gateway to Israel, it is vulnerable to Iraqi pressure.

Turkey

Turkey controls another major oil pipeline from Iraq, but has little to gain from satisfying U.S. hopes it will turn off the tap.

Lebanon

Iraq complicated the hostage situation. Saddam now controls the 15 Shiite Muslim hostages in Kuwait, whose release might help free U.S. hostages in Lebanon. It also enhanced Iraq's prestige against its rivals in the Lebanese civil war.

Iran

Strange bedfellows: after eight years of all-out hostility in the gulf war, Iran joined Iraq in the campaign for higher oil prices. The strategy of squeezing Kuwait emerged from a secret Iran-Iraq meeting in July.

Egypt

President Hosni Mubarak suffered public humiliation when Iraqi tanks rolled in.

Sunday, as long as no one crossed them. But Saddam gave no sign of loosening his grip on Kuwait. Meanwhile his forces moved ominously close to the emirate's border with Saudi Arabia, an even more important player in the international oil game and another "moderate" Arab country that was pathetically vulnerable to the Iraqi legions.

Working the phones: George Bush responded to Saddam's "naked aggression" by imposing an embargo on most U.S. trade with Iraq and by freezing \$30 billion worth of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. Bush worked the phones, trying to rally timid Arab leaders against Saddam and pleading for help from other democracies. On the face of it, he got impressive support. The European Community imposed an embargo on oil from Iraq and Kuwait. Even the cautious Japanese froze some of the assets Saddam seized. The United Nations Security Council demanded immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, threatening to impose mandatory sanctions if Saddam refused. The Soviet Union, Saddam's biggest arms supplier, abruptly cut him off. A day later the Soviets joined the Americans in an unprecedented declaration calling for an international embargo on all arms supplies to Iraq.



Bush ordered three aircraft-carrier task forces to the region and insisted that all of his options remained open. To protect "vi-

tal" U.S. interests, he said he was ready to assist Saudi Arabia "in any way we possibly can"—as long as the Saudis ask for help. But no one expected Bush to get into a land war with an Iraqi Army that uses poison gas and ballistic missiles and can put more tanks in the field than Britain

and France combined. And no one expected the Saudis or any of Saddam's other potential victims to ask for trouble by operating with Washington in their own defense. When the Arab League finally condemned the Iraqi invasion, eight of its members abstained or voted against it.



'None of us can do it separately': Britain's Thatcher with the president in Chicago



Kuwait. Not nine days before, Saddam assured him invasion was not an option. At risk was a cherished Egyptian role as regional mediator. Also in peril: Egypt's own claim to be the center of Pan-Arabism.

Other Countries

Anything that affects the cost of energy affects the world. Among the non-Mideast interests at play: the **United States** has long tried to keep a balance of power in the region by ensuring that no one gulf country becomes dominant; Iraq is a challenge to that policy, as well as a force for driving up oil prices. Perhaps the biggest risk for Washington: by doing nothing, it loses credibility throughout the region. **Japan** imports 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East; from Tokyo's viewpoint, price stability under an Iraqi regime is probably preferable to a regional war leading to raids on the oilfields themselves.

The stakes are high for the newly freed nations of **Eastern Europe**: their feeble economies, long addicted to subsidized Soviet oil, might not survive a market of skyrocketing prices. Also vulnerable: the developing countries of **Asia** and **Latin America**. South Korea and Thailand count on energy-hungry heavy industry; so, too, do Brazil and Chile.

resolution. Nor were economic sanctions likely to have a decisive impact in a world that is thirsty for oil and fearful of blackmailers like Saddam.

Some White House officials were concerned that the pro-Western Arabs would try to talk their way out of the jam. "The Saudis have enough cash to solve this situation," a senior Bush aide argued cynically. "Somebody will write a check, and it'll be over." The White House was counting on Saddam's good sense to avoid a wider war over Saudi Arabia. "He's nuts, but he's not that nuts," theorized one official.

But Saddam was reckless enough to attack Iran in 1980, setting off an eight-year war that nearly destroyed him. Now he presents the United States with its first big military crisis of the post-cold-war era. Despite the huge arms buildup of the Reagan-Bush years, the U.S. military is not ready for the challenge. A pell-mell arms race in the region—including missiles, chemical weapons and covert nuclear programs—has contributed to rising tensions. And Washington's capability to intervene effectively has not kept pace with the growth in size and sophistication of local forces that American troops might have to confront.

Saddam had the simplest of motives for attacking Kuwait. "He needs the Kuwaiti wealth," said a senior official of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which now cooperates closely with Iraq. The long

struggle with Iran left Iraq bankrupt. Saddam borrowed \$60 billion or more to pay for the war, and although Iraq has large reserves of oil, he couldn't sell it for enough money to cover the debt. With food in short supply, black marketeers made obscene profits, for which some people blamed Saddam himself. The dictator worried about being overthrown.

'I'm going to take it': At a recent Arab conference, Saddam demanded help from the rich gulf states. "I need \$30 billion," he was quoted as saying, "and if they don't give it to me, I'm going to take it from them." Kuwait had helped Iraq before, lending Saddam as much as \$15 billion, interest-free, to use against Iran. But the war ended two years ago: what had the Kuwaitis done for him lately? Saddam wanted Kuwait to write off the wartime loans. He also complained, with some justification, that Kuwait had helped to drive down the world price of oil by pumping more crude than it was allotted under production quotas set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The Iraqi dictator claimed that excess pumping had cost Iraq \$14 billion in lost oil revenues. With his Army massing along Kuwait's border last month, OPEC agreed to raise its benchmark price for a barrel of crude from \$18 to \$21. Saddam wanted \$25. He believed that his people had sacrificed themselves for the Arab cause by fighting

Iran and were now being victimized by their wealthy neighbors.

Saddam had other designs on Kuwait. Iraq has long staked a dubious historical claim to all the territory of the emirate. More to the point these days, Kuwait blocks Iraq's access to the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf. For years, Kuwait has refused to lease to Baghdad two islands that control the approaches to Umm Qasr, Iraq's sole functioning port on the gulf. Saddam's only other outlet is the Shatt al-Arab waterway, for which he attacked Iran, and that artery is still blocked by the wreckage of war.

When Saddam began to deploy troops along the border, they did not appear to be equipped for an invasion. But starting around July 25, the Iraqis moved up heavier divisions, and by last Monday the CIA was warning the White House that an invasion seemed imminent. Saddam tried to mask his intentions. Iraq told the United States and various Arab leaders, including Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, that it did not plan military action against Kuwait. Even after the invasion began, Iraq's ambassador to Washington, Mohammad al-Mashat, assured reporters that "the events currently occurring in Kuwait are an internal affair with which Iraq has no relation."

Saddam's attack brooked no opposition. The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram



Fire fight: Iraqis take cover behind an armored vehicle in skirmish with defenders


claimed, in an unsourced report, that 120 Iraqi officers had been executed for questioning the wisdom of the invasion. The Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, escaped Saddam's net, but his family's rule appeared to be over for good after nearly 250 years. An Iraqi spokesman said there could be "no return to the extinct regime after the sun of dignity and honor has shone." Although Iraq claimed it had invaded in response to an appeal for help from "young revolutionaries" who had overthrown the emir, no new government immediately stepped forward. According to Kuwaitis outside the country, Ahmad Saadoun, a member of Kuwait's Parliament, was thrown into jail after he refused to join the new regime.

A military government: Eventually Baghdad announced that a new Kuwaiti Army was being set up and that it would enlist Arabs of any nationality "who wish stability for Kuwait in its new age." According to an Iraqi news agency, about 140,000 Iraqis already had volunteered—more than the number of Iraqi troops already in Kuwait. Later, Baghdad said the "revolutionaries" had finally set up a new government led by nine Kuwaiti military officers. It identified a colonel named Alaa Hussein Ali as prime minister, commander in chief and minister of Defense and the Interior. In Tunis, the Kuwaiti Embassy, still loyal to the emir, said Colonel Ali was no Kuwaiti; in fact, he was Saddam's son-in-law, the embassy charged.

The Iraqis also insisted that their forces were not poised for an attack on Saudi Arabia. In Washington, Ambassador al-Mashat denied "emphatically and cate-

gorically ... that Iraq harbors any designs" on Saudi Arabia. (He also announced that 11 of 14 U.S. citizens who had been reported missing after the invasion of Kuwait had been located and taken to Baghdad and were free to go.) Saddam's enemies did not believe him. "Knowing Saddam, if in 30 days nothing happens except verbal threats, he will take over the eastern part of Saudi Arabia [where the oilfields are located] and of course Abu Dhabi and all the rest," said Saad Jabr, an exiled Iraqi politician in London. "And if anyone moves against him, he will threaten to blow it up."

An 'extinct regime': Kuwait's ousted emir
ALAIN NOGUES—SYGMA



In the White House, contingency planning went forward for both economic and military moves against Iraq. But one of Bush's aides conceded: "We're still in a holding pattern. The Saudis don't want to do anything that involves us unless they have to. They want to solve it themselves so for the moment they're holding us at bay." For years, the Saudis and the late Shah of Iran were regarded by Washington as "twin pillars" that would help the West maintain stability in the Persian Gulf. But the shah was overthrown in 1979, and the Saudis have become notorious for their timidity, despite a steady flow of U.S. arms and advice.

Appeasement policies: After more than a decade of turmoil, the power vacuum in the gulf is now filled by Saddam Hussein. He has long been the beneficiary of appeasement by both the Arabs and the West. Washington tilted toward Iraq during its war with Iran, which Americans regarded as the greater of the two evils. Saddam's atrocities, including the use of poison gas against rebel noncombatants in his own country, went unpunished. Only last month the administration urged the Senate not to vote sanctions against Iraq because they would impair "our ability to exercise a restraining influence on Iraqi actions."

Military options are available for putting Saddam back in his place. A direct attack on his forces in Kuwait does seem unthinkable. "You're talking about 100,000 Iraqi soldiers in a country of 1.4 million people," says a U.S. official. "It would be a nightmare." But a combination of military and political action could put a firm squeeze on Saddam by cutting off his exports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil—virtually his only source of revenue. All that's required is for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to shut down the pipelines that cross their territory and for someone—probably the United States—to blockade the narrow shipping lanes in the northern gulf.

Of course, none of that is likely to happen. "The Saudis always get cold feet," complains a diplomat from another Arab country. Heavily outgunned by Iraq and fearful of internal unrest, the Saudis do not want to challenge Saddam head-on. Nor are they inclined to give Washington the military bases that would be needed for a credible U.S. defense of Saudi Arabia. Turkey, a NATO ally, isn't spoiling for a fight, either. The Turks get most of their oil from Iraq, at preferential rates. NATO's shield would not necessarily protect them from Iraqi military reprisals. When Bush telephoned Turkish President Turgut Ozal last week, the two men skipped around the crucial question of whether Turkey would cut Iraq's pipeline. Bush listed it as one option among others, says a White House source, and "Ozal didn't bite."

Short of military action, the world could

bring Saddam to his knees by sustaining a more or less leakproof embargo on the purchase of oil from Iraq or Kuwait. If Saddam's oil income dries up, and if his overseas assets remain frozen, he could soon face a devastating credit crunch. "The best thing we have going for us is that Saddam is broke and that he's heavily dependent on food imports," says a senior U.S. official. There is a steep price to pay for an oil embargo. Between them, Iraq and Kuwait control about 20 percent of the world's oil reserves. If their crude is taken off the

market for long, the rising price of oil could deal a staggering blow to many economies, including America's. And it is easy to cheat on an oil embargo; unscrupulous sellers—or oil-hungry buyers—have only to pretend that Iraqi or Kuwaiti oil comes from somewhere else.

It is probably too late to rescue Kuwait from the clutches of Saddam Hussein. But it is not too late to stop further aggression, which would impose a price of its own on the rest of the world. In the post-cold-war era, stopping Saddam requires a new corre-

lation of forces—an alliance of the majority. "None of us can do it separately," British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said in Colorado, where she met with Bush. If the world shows enough backbone, the crusade against Saddam won't take long. It will be enough to hold him in check for a while until his brutal and reckless rule creates the conditions of his own undoing.

RUSSELL WATSON with RAY WILKINSON and ROD NORDLAND in the gulf; MARGARET GARRARD WARNER and THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington; CHRISTOPHER DICKEY in Paris and bureau reports

Target: Jerusalem?

Jerusalem echoed with choruses of "I told you so" last week. Was the West taken by surprise when Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait? Israel claimed not to be: officials warned for months of Saddam Hussein's growing belligerence. Members of the right-wing Likud government seemed almost relieved. The invasion distracted Western attention from the Palestinian problem; it also reinforced Likud's argument that Mid-east peace depends not on a Palestinian settlement but on curbing Arab aggression. And while Israel has no particular stake in Kuwait, it must wonder about the scope of Iraqi ambition. Where does Israel draw the line?

The proliferation of high-tech weaponry—ballistic missiles with chemical or nuclear warheads—has created a hair-trigger balance of terror between Israel and Iraq. According to the CIA, Iraq is still at least five years away from nuclear capability. Israel, which already has it, has a powerful incentive to see that Saddam never catches up.

The Israelis launched a preemptive strike against Iraq once before—in 1981, when Israeli warplanes knocked out a nuclear reactor at Osirak. But that was a lightly defended target. This time, Iraqi offensive missiles are spread out in two dozen clusters around Baghdad and protected by surface-to-air missiles, mostly Soviet-made SAM-13s and SAM-14s. A U.S. Army War

College study earlier this year concluded that the Israelis could eliminate the Iraqi first-strike missiles—but only if Israel was willing to take heavy losses. Furthermore, a preemptive strike would need to be a complete knockout. In the 1967 war, Israel eliminated 80 percent of Egypt's aircraft in a surprise attack. In 1973, the Israeli military claims to have taken out 90 percent of Syria's SAM batteries in the first day. But Iraq's targets are better defended—and even a 90 percent success rate would leave untouched a few "city-buster" missiles with chemical warheads, enough to rain death on Tel Aviv.

Saddam Hussein could force Israel's hand by sending Iraqi forces into Jordan. Such a move, turning Iraq into a "frontline state," would be foolish; he would be repeating the mistake of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was



MOSHE MILNER—SYGMA

Where does Israel draw the line? Fighters at base in Negev

drawn in the 1950s into a futile and debilitating confrontation with Israel across the Sinai desert. But circumstances, like turmoil in Jordan, could set off a scramble for control of that kingdom. The Iraqis already have close military ties with Jordan, sharing intelligence and air defenses. Because Jordan is bankrupt, Iraq helps bankroll its Air Force. Israel has been watching nervously as Iraqi Army division

commanders visit Jordanian units stationed along the River Jordan. Their purpose is clear: to view the terrain for battle, what British officers sportingly call "walking the course."

The Israeli government has declared Jordan to be the "Red Line." Iraqi incursion would provoke a military response. Escalation is easy to imagine: the Israeli Air Force would bomb Iraqi convoys bearing missiles and tanks; the Iraqis would strike Israeli airfields. Casualties would mount. The Israeli government would be under pressure to play its trump card: a nuclear weapon, perhaps in a demonstration detonation over uninhabited desert. That might tempt Saddam to use his own missiles rather than lose them, spreading poison gas across Israel. Israel might then be forced to use nuclear weapons against an enemy for the first time since the United States dropped the bomb on Japan in 1945.

JOHN BARRY with THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem

The Military Matchup

Saddam Hussein's eight-year war against Iran gave him the Mideast's largest and most battle-hardened Army, but Israel retains a technological edge—and a nuclear capability.

	Iraq	Israel
Active armed forces	1,000,000	141,000
Reserves	850,000	504,000
Main battle tanks	5,500	3,794
Combat aircraft	513	676
Surface-to-surface missiles (intermediate range)	More than 66	More than 12

SOURCE: THE MILITARY BALANCE 1989-1990

'The Anchor and Hope of the Weak and the Meek'

Saddam Hussein as leader of a Pan-Arab world

Saddam, we will give our blood for you!
—From an Iraqi children's song

They call him heir to the legend of King Nebuchadnezzar. His image graces street corners throughout Baghdad. Songs glorify his exploits. Artists paint his portrait with streaks of their own blood. The press is obsequious: "You're the anchor and hope of the meek and the weak," wrote the English-language Baghdad Observer. "You're insurmountable like the highest peak." President Saddam Hussein isn't one to disagree. Born to poverty, bent on power, he finds the adulation nothing if not natural. Asked once about the flourishing personality cult, the self-described "Knight of the Arab Nation" just shrugged: "My people do that. Not me." Baghdad's new Victory Square is dominated by two huge crossed sabers held by hands sculpted to duplicate Saddam's—right down to the whorls of his fingerprints.

As a symbol, the sculpture is peculiarly apt. He is a man who respects might more than diplomacy. Politicized in his teens, Saddam's first role was as a hit man for the political party he'd later take over. At the age of 22, he poured a hail of bullets into President Abdul-Karem Kassim's car, but succeeded in killing only Kassim's driver and an aide. When he took power for himself, in 1979, he arranged to have 22 of his top rivals executed. The taste for brutality persists. It is dangerous to be either too disaffected or too ambitious in his country; the Washington-based group Middle East Watch calls Iraq "one of the most brutal and repressive regimes now in power." Saddam's methods: "relocation and deportation, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, disappearance and summary political execution." Said Yehoshua Saguy, a member of the Israeli Parliament who is a former chief of military intelligence there, "He is a composed, pragmatic individual who lacks the usual morals common to human beings." "As blood-thirsty as Hitler ever was," agreed a senior Arab diplomat in the gulf.

So far, the approach has proved crude but effective. Repression has kept dissent to a minimum within Iraq. And Saddam's regional military moves have been calculated adeptly; ruthlessness and boundless



KOL AL ARAB

'Knight of the Arab Nation': In traditional garb

ambition have not prevented him from remaining flexible. He tried threatening the Shah of Iran and the gulf princes on oil prices in the 1970s. When that didn't work, he turned to cajolery, though it is hardly his style; Saddam's first name means "One Who Confronts." When postrevolutionary turmoil in Iran seemed to have sapped its defenses, Saddam seized the opportunity to grab a long-disputed border strip, provoking the eight-year war that cost Iraq nearly 1 million dead and wounded.

His belligerence toward Israel has been unflagging—and has won him support among many Arabs. And even the most subtle signs of approval feed Saddam's ultimate ambition to become a Pan-Arab leader. "Saddam Hussein thinks in terms of circles," said Amitzia Baram, a Haifa University expert on Iraq. "His most immediate circle is the gulf, which remains No. 1 for

him. But beyond that there is the circle of the Arab world, where he aspires to hegemony, to being the single most important leader... He sees himself as Nasser's heir in the Arab world."

Clues to that ambition are everywhere. But they are clearest in the ancient city of Babylon, where Nebuchadnezzar ruled six centuries before the birth of Christ. There, Saddam has ordered a multimillion-dollar

restoration project and hopes to someday re-create the city's hanging gardens, once one of the world's seven wonders. Ancient inscriptions hailing Nebuchadnezzar as "King of Babylon from far sea to far sea" (an area that covers the modern states of Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and Israel) lie beside new ones boasting: "Rebuilt in the era of Saddam Hussein." The overall effect, however, falls short of Saddam's grand vision. "Disneyland without Mickey Mouse," snorted a Western archaeologist. Real grandeur may have to await the construction of the president's new, several-billion-dollar Qadisiyah Palace, which will come complete with a re-creation of the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Living in fear: Apologists say Saddam's true achievement has been to keep Iraq in one piece in spite of a faltering economy and a foreign debt of \$60 billion to \$80 billion. They argue that he has avoided the pitfalls of corruption, kept fundamentalist tides in check, raised the literacy rate, built schools and universities and

spent the country's oil revenues on agriculture, health services and electrification. But for all those accomplishments and all his power, Saddam lives each day in fear.

Detractors are kept in check by an elaborate network of security agents. Backed by a draconian set of laws, they have inspired a national paranoia so deep that more than 1 million Iraqis have fled the police state. Jails are full of the regime's enemies and international agencies claim that torture, even against infants, is commonplace. So completely did Saddam identify with Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, in fact, that when he fell, Saddam ordered his security agents to study the events to learn how to avoid a similar fate. That fear is one no statues, palaces or iconographic paintings can erase.

C. S. MANEGOLD with RAY WILKINSON in Dubai,
CHRISTOPHER DICKEY in Paris,
THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem and
TONY CLIFTON in New York

**IRAQ'S
POWER
PLAY**

SPECIAL REPORT

Requiem for an Oil Kingdom

Kuwait's wealth made it a target of resentment

Once there was a fabulous emirate where every citizen could be rich as a king. The people built themselves three-story mansions out of Italian marble. A futuristic glass-and-steel capital rose from the desert sand, complete with a Disney-esque amusement park named Entertainment City. At a vast shopping mall called Sultan Center, where the supermarkets stayed open 24 hours, the people browsed among French fashions by day and sampled Norwegian salmon at night. At the ice-skating rink, robed men glided on a spot where camels used to roam. Abroad, they bought control of everything from California real estate to the largest paper mill in Spain. This place was called Kuwait. Oil money built it. The Kuwaitis thought they would live happily ever after—until Iraq came and took Never-Never Land away.

The mini-nation whose independence was ended, possibly forever, last week, used to be little more than a Bedouin trading post. For centuries, the desert sandscape was broken only by the occasional mud-brick fort. (The Arabic name Kuwait itself means "little fortress.") But since gaining independence from Britain in 1961, Kuwait's petrobillions, astutely managed by the ruling al-Sabah clan, transformed the fortress into a financial powerhouse. The country's assets overseas total \$100 billion—not to mention the \$50 billion the ruling family and other Kuwaitis hold privately. These investments guaranteed Kuwait would be rich even after its oil runs out—sometime in the 22nd century. And the al-Sabahs built a generous welfare state at home. Kuwaitis paid no income taxes, but enjoyed nearly free education and medical care, as well as a \$140 monthly allowance per child and a per-couple bonus of \$7,100 just for

IRAQ'S POWER PLAY

By the standards of repressive Arab neighbors like Iraq, the al-Sabahs' rule was enlightened; they permitted a free press and a noisy National Assembly, although the vote was restricted to about 60,000 propertied males. The only thing the al-Sabahs couldn't tolerate was public deviation from strict Muslim propriety; alcohol was illegal, and at the ice-skating rink an older "morals minder" cruised about rapping the ankles of any young man who might skate too close to a woman. Of course, the full fruits of the al-Sabahs' beneficence were granted only to native Kuwaitis—just 40 percent of the country's

getting married. With government help, some 10,000 got American college educations.

2.1 million inhabitants. The other 60 percent are foreign workers. Filipino women care for Kuwaiti children. Iranians and Palestinians (the largest foreign group at more than 400,000) staff its banks, offices and hospitals. Some 10,000 Americans and Britons have kept the oilfields running.

Demanding democracy: In recent years, though, there has been trouble in this petro-paradise. In 1983, Shiite Muslims with links to Iran bombed the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait city. In 1986, the al-Sabahs temporarily restricted the press and shut down the Parliament. They did so to dampen criticism of its dangerous warring neighbors, Iran and Iraq—but also to silence critics of the al-Sabahs. Early this year protesters demanded democratization. In May, government agents stormed private homes and rounded up eight leaders of the incipient movement.

The most important thing the al-Sabahs' billions couldn't buy was safety. The dynasty tried to keep Iran at bay by asking the United States to protect its tanker fleet in 1987; meanwhile, it bought off Saddam Hussein with \$10 billion in interest-free loans. Although Kuwait's protection money helped finance Saddam's war against the Persian outsiders, Kuwaitis became objects of Arab resentment. They flaunted their wealth. Arabs without oil saw them as parvenus. Arab radicals said the Kuwaitis were too close to the West. They were seen as cushioning themselves against lower oil prices by producing more than their OPEC quotas, while Iraqis and Palestinians fought and died for the Arab cause. This may explain part of the Arab slowness to rush to Kuwait's side after Saddam's blitzkrieg. In the end, while gleaming glass had replaced Kuwait's walls of mud, its national existence still rested on a foundation of sand.

CHARLES LANE with RAY WILKINSON in Dubai and CAROL BERGER in Cairo



Money can't buy safety: Kuwaitis rally in London with posters of the emir



And Now: The War of the Future

In a post-cold-war world, regional conflicts will be the main danger—and test the limits of U.S. power

With the news that Iraqi troops had advanced to within a mile of Saudi Arabia, the scenario that weighed heavily on the minds of Western military planners last weekend was nothing short of a nightmare: how to defend Saudi Arabia, with its 19 percent share of the world's proven oil reserves, from invasion by Saddam Hussein. News accounts of frantic preparations by U.S. commanders were utterly beside the point, for knowledgeable military analysts agreed that no combination of rapidly deployable U.S. land or naval forces could defend the desert kingdom from Iraq's huge Army. The Saudi scenario, in short, raised not only the possibility of war in a very far place, it was depressing proof that the United States, after 40 years of planning for the Big One in Central Europe, is largely unprepared for conflict in other parts of the world.

It may well be that the relaxation of superpower tensions has made such regional conflicts more likely. Like other Third World strongmen, Saddam Hussein can see that the Soviet Union's zeal for

IRAQ'S POWER PLAY

keeping its client states in line has dwindled to the vanishing point, and he may now sense that he has a free hand to pursue his longstanding grudge with OPEC and the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. An aggressive gambler made confident by victory in the war against Iran, Saddam now has other uses for one of the

best-trained and best-equipped armies in the region. For worried U.S. strategists, the underlying message is that this may be the model for wars to come.

Leave aside for the moment unresolved questions of U.S. strategic interests in the post-cold-war era—the debate over where and why, in a less structured and perennially conflictual world, America and its allies must be prepared to fight. The military's job is to prepare for the full range of eventualities—a Kuwait, a Panama, or even a Vietnam. But even on that simpler level, the debate has a staggering complexity. The end of the cold war left Congress determined to chop billions from the defense budget, as recent debates on Capitol Hill demonstrate all too well. The Penta-

ground for the Middle East and an uncertain mission: *The carrier Independence*

JIM DAVIDSON—AP



New questions about U.S. global readiness: *The Army's 82nd*

gon, meanwhile, is groping for a workable plan to downsize its budget without gutting its real-world capabilities. "It is a very difficult proposition to look 20 years ahead and say, 'I know with absolute certainty what the world's going to look like,'" Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney told NEWSWEEK recently. "I can't find anybody who knew 18 months ago what was going to happen over the past 18 months."

The Iraqi invasion shows that Cheney, along with George Bush and all other world leaders, won't get even one month to plan the defense of the status quo. And the undoubted effectiveness of the Iraqi Army underscores another deeply disturbing fact. Year by year and nation by nation, Third World governments like Saddam Hussein's have begun to achieve levels of military power that can realistically confront any conventional force the West can muster. This creeping escalation of military capability is due in part to wide-open arms sales by the United States, the Soviet Union and other developed countries. It is also due to the advent of high-tech weapons like the Exocet missile, which offer highly effective and relatively cheap (about

\$250,000 per unit) sive power. They them. T pilots po beyond Stark ca two of and dis away to conflict

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GARY KIEFER

The Army's 82nd Airborne Division, training for jungle warfare, conducts full-dress field maneuvers in Honduras during 1987

\$250,000, in the case of the Exocet) offensive power to any nation that chooses to buy them. That Exocets in the hands of Iraqi pilots pose a distinct threat to U.S. forces is beyond dispute, as the crew of the USS Stark can attest to. Finally, it is an effect of two of the soldier's oldest enemies: time and distance. The United States is too far away to respond quickly to the regional conflicts of the post-cold-war era.

One consequence of the shifting rules of world order is that the United States must begin to compare itself militarily with Third World powers like Iraq. That comparison is sobering. Saddam Hussein has an Army of between 650,000 and 1 million—the U.S. Army numbers only 700,000—led by the battle-hardened victors of the long war against Iran. He has more than 500 combat aircraft, about 5,500 Soviet- and Chinese-built main battle tanks, more than 8,000 fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, more than 500 self-propelled artillery weapons and a large array of rocket launchers and towed field guns. In Kuwait (or, if the nightmare scenario proves true, Saudi Arabia), the desert terrain presents highly favorable conditions

for the offensive use of tanks. And it is worth noting, as Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently observed, that Iraq today has more tanks than both sides had in North Africa in World War II.

Scattered legions: Against all that, the full might of the U.S. military colossus has essentially no chance—no chance, that is, if Middle Eastern wars of aggression, like Civil War cavalry battles, are won by those who get there fustest with the mostest. The reason is simple: although the United States has more tanks, more men, more air power and far more sea power than Iraq, its forces are scattered from Korea to Western Europe and everywhere in between—particularly in the continental United States, which is approximately 7,000 miles from the scene of the crime. Prudent military thinkers like Adm. William Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have warned for years that the United States lacks the ability to move men and matériel to the Middle East in time to deter a Soviet strike through Iran. The Soviet threat has subsided, but the United States faces the same logistical problems now.

Since 1980, when Jimmy Carter declared the protection of the West's oil supplies to be a matter of national security, the Pentagon has theoretically been preparing to defend the Persian Gulf. But the Saudis and their neighbors have consistently refused to grant basing rights to the United States where the facilities would do the most good—along the Persian Gulf itself, within easy reach of the Kuwait-Iraq frontier and Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Pentagon was forced to establish its only real base east of Turkey on Diego Garcia, a tiny island 2,600 miles out in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon now has five surface ships stuffed with everything from ammunition to medical supplies to K rations tied up at Diego Garcia. And while it is true that the supplies stored on those ships would support a division-size Marine or Army assault team for up to 30 days, no military expert wants to throw such a lightly armed force into battle against the Iraqi armor.

The Marines, even if augmented with the Army's two airborne and four light-infantry divisions, would add up to a force of 112,000 men and only several hundred tanks, no match for the Iraqis in size or

firepower. Operating in massed formations across open terrain like the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq's divisions of main battle tanks are awesome weapons that would surely crush a U.S. assault force with its handful of obsolescent M-60 tanks. Knowledgeable analysts are skeptical of the Army's claim that late-model antitank weapons, like the wire-guided TOW 2A missile, would be effective against the heavily armored Soviet T-72. And U.S. tactical air support, given the distances from the necessary high-tech base facilities, could provide only limited support.

Moving a significant portion of the Army's 12 "heavy" divisions with their 200,000 men and some 3,700 tanks into the Persian Gulf is a monumental—indeed, impossible—task. In the view of Pentagon

options in the short run: the Navy and the Air Force. In last week's face-off, with the carrier Independence steaming toward the Persian Gulf, U.S. strategists seemed to be contemplating a seaborne counter-threat. But the Stark disaster and the downing of the Iranian Airbus in 1988 both illustrated the limitations of fleet air defense in the modern age; the Navy has long been reluctant to send a carrier task force into the confined waters of the Persian Gulf. That means carrier air power would have to operate from very long range—probably from outside the Strait of Hormuz, more than 500 miles away—and suffer a substantial reduction in time-over-target. If the United States hopes to deter a formidable land-based force like the Iraqi Army, even a 500-ship Navy is of little use.

on range and total bomb load, however, there is no question B-52s would be more useful than the B-2 Stealth bomber.

With its obvious threat to the economic security of the West, Saddam Hussein's Kuwaiti adventure is a potent reminder that America has hard choices to make if it means to keep the peace—and it is a blunt rebuke to those who thought that winding down the cold war would necessarily create any significant sort of "peace dividend." Instead, Congress and the Pentagon now must think harder than ever about the meaning of national security in moments of international tension. "In a way, it's lucky that this crisis is hitting us now, rather than in five years' time," said Middle East defense expert Seth Carus of the Naval War College. "Right now, Saddam Hussein doesn't have nuclear weapons, and our defense-budget cuts haven't begun to bite."

Budget wars: "Lucky" may be an odd word to use at a time when political leaders the world over are wondering whether a shooting war is about to break out along the Persian Gulf. It may seem strange, too, that Washington tends to view the Iraqi invasion through the singularly parochial prism of the Pentagon's budget wars with Congress. It is likely, however, that U.S. policymakers at all levels are already developing a new conventional wisdom from the ominous developments in Kuwait. Some of them have to do with the same old subject that has preoccupied Washington for years—which weapons systems to buy, and in what amounts. Others have to do with what the Pentagon calls readiness—the shopworn but eminently relevant notion that U.S. forces must be prepared to move, and move in force, to any point at any moment. And finally, there is the mind-boggling task of agreeing on the most likely missions for the military. The Middle East, after all, is well suited for large-force encounters of the sort that U.S. planners have always preferred. But what about the jungles of Asia and Latin America, where a replay of Vietnam-style, small-unit combat is far more likely?

The Kuwait crisis may well be a portent of things to come: a war over vital resources, and one that pits a reckless Third World dictator against the weary titans of the West. Indeed, it is hard to see how conflict in any other region in the world could produce so grave a threat to the continued prosperity of the developed nations. But there is no guarantee that the United States and its allies can avoid being drawn into regional conflicts over festering issues like poverty, religion, national sovereignty or even drugs. If that happens, America and its fighting men may look back on the anxieties of the cold war with a considerable measure of nostalgia.

TOM MORGANTHAU with JOHN BARRY
in Washington



Low-cost threat to great-power navies: The air-launched Exocet at the Paris Air Show JACQUES WITT—SIPA

planners, it would require a minimum of 60 days to move even two divisions—and 60 days is plenty of time for an attacking force to oust King Fahd, seize control of the Saudi oilfields and prepare defensive positions. (The Iraqis are known to have a large arsenal of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles to ward off airstrikes.) The critical point, from the view of U.S. planners, is that the United States has long lacked the kind of air and sea capability that would be necessary to put U.S. forces on the ground in the Middle East and supply them. That fact—the missing link in U.S. defense strategy under any conceivable scenario—has been an open secret for most of the cold-war years. Even so, neither the Pentagon nor Congress has been very interested in buying such unglamorous hardware as transport ships and planes.

That leaves Washington with only two

The remaining question is whether the U.S. Air Force, which has the ability to deliver long-distance strikes against massed troop and tank formations, would be of any significant use in the Middle East. A suitable base exists at Adana, in south-central Turkey. From there, assuming the Turks agreed, squadrons of B-52s or FB-111s, the planes that bombed Muammar Kaddafi's barracks in 1986, could plaster the desert with bombs. But the debate over strategic air power—whether it works, and whether the level of civilian casualties is worth the price—has been raging since World War II. Bombing North Vietnam, defended by primitive versions of the surface-to-air missiles that Iraq now has in abundance, did not weaken Hanoi's will to prosecute the war, and it is an open question whether B-52 strikes would deter Saddam Hussein. Given the high premium

Tanks and Troops Exact a Heavy Price

Sharply rising energy costs threaten a recession in the United States

Iraqi tanks shimmered in the sweltering heat, their cannons pointed toward Kuwaiti refineries and rigs. Troops in desert camouflage rounded up production workers and detained at least a handful of American technicians. As the clatter of the Kuwaiti oilfields died down last week, financial markets went into tailspins around the world. Talk of inflation and recession dogged the futures markets,

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where frantic traders bid up the price of oil by 14 percent in just two days. Filling-station operators were already posting new prices, reviving memories of the gas lines of the 1970s. The energy crisis had not returned—at least not yet—but the source of the worry was real. Through

an act of cynical piracy, Saddam Hussein had seized effective control of 20 percent of the world's proven reserves of oil.

Worse still, Saddam seemed intent on forcing sharply higher prices on consumers around the globe. At an OPEC meeting in Geneva two weeks ago, Iraq demanded that the cartel raise its target price nearly 40 percent, from \$18 to \$25 a barrel. The invasion of Kuwait was a demonstration of how far Saddam was willing to go to get his way. While the cartel had settled on a level of \$21 a barrel, the price last week was headed higher than that: the benchmark West Texas Intermediate Crude closed Friday at \$24.69 (chart). One prophet of moderate doom is Philip Verleger of the Institute for International Economics. Oil prices will rise above \$30 a barrel by the end of this year, he predicts, throwing the United States into a medium-size recession. By the second quarter of 1991, his forecast suggests, unemployment will have jumped to above 7 percent, and inflation will surge to 9 percent by next winter. Verleger offers two scenarios, equally bleak. Iraq may succeed in intimidating all its gulf neighbors into cutting production. Or U.S.-sponsored sanctions may reduce the industrial nations' purchases of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. Either way, supplies fail to meet global demand—and higher oil prices prevail.



ROBERT-SYGMA

Economics of intimidation: Drilling in a Kuwaiti field

Built on Sand

Americans depend on the gulf for more than 10 percent of their oil.

Source	Oil imports as a % of total U.S. consumption, 1989
Iraq	2.6%
Kuwait	1.0%
Saudi Arabia	7.1%
Algeria	1.5%
Other Arab OPEC	0.2%
Non-Arab OPEC	11.6%
Other countries	22.4%

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency

Others offer a more sanguine scenario. During the first quarter of 1990, Iraq accounted for 6 percent of the noncommunist world's production of oil, while Kuwait supplied only half of that. And Iraq is sorely pressed for cash. Even if Kuwait's oil remains shut off completely, Iraq will attempt to maintain full production.

Thus on the surface, says one Paris-based oil economist, "you're only looking at the loss of 1.7 million barrels a day, or 3 percent of the world's oil supply outside communist countries." That shortfall could be absorbed without a ruinous rise in prices. But the analysis ignores the intimidation factor in a gulf region that last year supplied more than 30 percent of the oil extracted outside the communist bloc. Iraq may be able to impose a cutback that would raise prices very quickly. Over the long run, that might be detrimental to OPEC: higher prices would promote conservation, non-OPEC production and the use of alternative fuels. But Saddam may be more concerned about raising immediate revenues to support his arms buildup and to feed his hard-pressed people. "He'd rake in a lot of cash," the Parisian economist says.

Barely growing: Much of that money would come from an already shaky U.S. economy. Charles Ebinger, a consultant with the International Resources Group, calculates that at current consumption American oil costs would rise by more than \$100 million a day with petroleum at \$25 a barrel. That

would translate to an increase of just over 20 cents a gallon in the price of gasoline—a serious burden on an economy that has been barely growing. The new hikes would increase the nation's trade deficit dramatically—and force the Federal Reserve Board to rein in credit to contain intensified inflationary pressures. Government reports indicated last week that the economy may already have slipped into recession: factory orders declined in June, and unemployment rose sharply in July.

The impact is likely to be even greater overseas. A price hike could not come at a worse time for Eastern Europe, where countries are only now getting used to life without subsidized Soviet oil. It would hammer the newly industrializing nations of Asia and Latin America, which increased their energy use dramatically during the 1980s. Particularly vulnerable: the heavy-industry economies of Brazil, Chile,

Washington's Budget Bowl

A spectator's guide to a no-win game

For the last 12 weeks, White House and congressional negotiators have stared across the table at one another in a windowless room on Capitol Hill. Their mission was to craft a bipartisan "Big Fix" for the nation's budget deficit. But not much happened during those marathon summit sessions, unless you count telling stories and drinking coffee as productive activities. Usually only half the summeiteers were in attendance. The congressional contingent was constantly on the go, answering bells that signaled votes or rushing out for photo ops. West Virginia Sen. Robert Byrd delivered eye-glazing lectures about the line-item veto and reminisced about his boyhood working in the coal fields. Rep. Jamie Whitten, 80, who chairs the House Appropriations Committee, periodically stirred to remind the conferees how Franklin Roosevelt brought the country out of the Depression. Budget director Richard Darman and White House chief of staff John Sununu tried to soothe their frustration by scarfing down dinner mints by the dozen. The idea behind a budget summit is that politicians can fix a problem behind closed doors. But these negotiators were as paralyzed in private as Congress usually is in public. Last week the talks formally collapsed in time for everyone to go for his August vacation. The White House blamed Congress for the impasse; Democrats blamed the White House; the media blamed everyone. But should the public be alarmed at this no-deal dance that has gone on for so many weeks? The answer is, not yet. What's happening is all too predictable when politicians play for tactical advantage. A spectator's guide to the budget talks:

Trial balloons: They shouldn't be taken seriously. One such trial balloon, a Republican proposal to cap state and local tax increases, is unlikely to be part of any package. Budget director Darman, a former gamesman, floated the proposal to see if the GOP is willing to tax the rich. The cap would fall hardest on Democratic strongholds like New York and Mas-



Everyone's playing for tactical advantage: Mitchell (left), Foley

sachusetts, where state taxes are high, and virtually exempt New Hampshire and Texas, GOP favorites. The real purpose of the proposal was to force the Democrats to come up with a counterproposal. It didn't work. "We did not pledge that every time the Republicans slit their wrists, we would

Seeking a 'Big Fix': Darman after a fall

BARRY THUMMA—AP



hardt shift back and forth between the two camps. Red-hot partisans dominate the talks. Tennessee Sen. Jim Sasser is the leading Democratic obstructionist; Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell enjoys scoring partisan points. The GOPs have a fire-breathing stable with Sununu, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich and Texas Sen. Phil Gramm.

Politicians' ability to act is in direct ratio to their pain threshold. There won't be a budget deal until the pain of not having one exceeds the pain of the actual deal. "The whole thing has to blow up before anyone can get down to business," says a presidential adviser. A stock-market crash would do, or a rebuff to incumbents in November. But absent a sense of crisis, don't be shocked if in the end lawmakers decide to postpone Gramm-Rudman, cook up a smoke-and-mirrors stopgap resolution—and promise to fix things next year.

ELEANOR CLIFT and THOMAS M. DEFRAK in Washington

all it takes," says Rep. Leon Panetta, chairman of the House Budget Committee.

Hot-so-hot deadlines: Deadlines are meant to be broken. The budgeteers have already missed two target dates. President George Bush toyed with calling an August congressional session but backed down.

With so many staffers holding nonrefundable airline tickets, "Why get everyone mad?" explains a senior aide. The first deadline that matters is Oct. 1, when the Gramm-Rudman automatic cuts kick in if there is no deal. Even then, lawmakers will be tempted to leave the bargaining to a lame-duck session after the November election. Under Gramm-Rudman a \$100 billion "sequester" of forced cuts could inflict genuine hardship: air-traffic delays, the closing of national parks and a million children without measles shots. But there is some dispute about how much pain would be felt. "Bush will find a way to keep essential government services going, and everybody knows it," says a senior Bush aide. Congressional staffers say the "drop dead" deadline for a budget agreement is Dec. 23, the Sunday before Christmas.

Goo-goos vs. pols: That's inside-the-Beltway language for Good Government reformers and partisan politicians. The leading goo-goos are Bush and House Speaker Thomas Foley. If the two men had secret ballots, they would not be that far apart. Darman and House Majority Leader Richard Gep-

A Statement by the President of Nigeria **IBRAHIM BABANGIDA**

When my government took over the leadership of Nigeria on August 27, 1985, the country was beset by tremendous problems. Because the most serious difficulties were economic, our immediate objective was to correct Nigeria's course, undertaking the restructuring necessary to set



President Babangida

us on a path to sustainable growth. To that end, we have instituted a number of programs and policies that we have consistently pursued over the last four years. Much has been accomplished.

Strengthening the Economy

Where we once were dependent on imported products, we now produce our own wheat and other commodities. There is still fine tuning to be

done, but a significant impact has been made.

Early on, it became apparent that the government had taken on too many burdens within the society. We embarked on a program to relieve the government of those burdens where practical, shifting them to the private sector. Our ongoing policy of privatization and commercialization of government-owned companies continues to go well, strengthening

War Path

As the U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia continues, Iraq's threats to round up American citizens raise the specter of a new hostage crisis—and heighten the chances of a full-scale war

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U.S. soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division arriving at a base in Saudi Arabia

AP/WIDE WORLD

As the U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia continues, Iraq's threats to round up American citizens raise the specter of a new hostage crisis—and heighten the chances of a full-scale war



U.S. soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division arriving at a base in Saudi Arabia

DENNIS BRACK—POOL

Once again, Saddam Hussein kept out of sight as an announcer read a statement on Iraqi television last Saturday. It contained a grim threat to the well-being of 3,100 Americans and thousands of other Westerners trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. The spokesman alluded to a warning the previous day that citizens of "aggressive nations" would be held prisoner at Iraqi military bases and other potential targets for American bombers. And he warned that, because of the international embargo on trade with Baghdad, the foreigners would have to share whatever food was left over after Iraqi soldiers and essential workers had been fed. The austerity would apply, he said, even to "the babies of foreign families."

As Iraq issued its threat, George Bush was out fishing off Kennebunkport, trying to pretend that a hostage crisis had not been added to his burdens. He had stressed all week that larger issues were involved, arguing in one speech that Saddam's aggression in the oilfields of the Persian Gulf threatened "our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries." After receiving a briefing on the Iraqi statement, Bush responded temperately to the threats, saying through his own spokesman that he was "deeply troubled" by the "use of innocent civilians as pawns."

There was no mention of retaliation.

The administration's plan was to wait Saddam out, hoping that the economic sanctions would start to bite soon. But contingency planning for a military operation was underway already, and if the Iraqis began to kill hostages, war seemed almost certain to follow. Even an effort to round up Americans in Kuwait for shipment to Baghdad could trigger a pre-emptive U.S. attack, not only on Saddam's forces in Kuwait, but on Iraq itself. Any rescue mission was certain to be bloody, and quite possibly disastrous. But failure to act at a moment of dire peril for the prisoners would look like the kind of impotence that helped to drive Jimmy Carter from office (page 23).

While American forces poured into Saudi Arabia, the standoff in the gulf turned a lot nastier. Bush and Saddam called each other liars. The Iraqi dictator warned that thousands of American soldiers could "go home shrouded in sad coffins." He abruptly offered to make peace with his archenemy, Iran, so that he could concentrate on his American foe in what he called "the great dueling arena." Bush imposed an outright naval blockade on Iraq, without waiting for the United Nations or anyone else. The first shots in that operation were fired on

**CRISIS
IN THE
GULF**



DENNIS BRACK—POOL

U.S. Air Force technicians inspecting a load of AIM 9 and AIM 7 missiles that is at the ready to arm U.S. F-15 fighter jets

Saturday when U.S. warships tried to stop Iraqi tankers at two separate locations. The tankers refused to stop, shots were fired across their bows, and the Iraqis sailed on. The Americans shadowed them and planned to board them, if necessary, after daybreak on Sunday.

'We can't give him time': Sustained fighting seemed more likely to arise from the situation on shore, including what one senior U.S. official referred to as "the hostage crisis, because that's what it is." Whether or not Saddam furnishes a suitable provocation, there will be growing pressure on Bush to use the force he has deployed. Military advisers will warn that the troops' effectiveness can only deteriorate in the harsh heat of the desert (page 24). Diplomats may conclude that military action is the only way to achieve one of Bush's main objectives: to get Saddam out of Kuwait and restore the emir who ruled there before the Iraqi invasion. Some Arab allies, out on a limb with Bush, are calling him to arms already. "Saddam is not going to back away without suffering a military blow," says a senior Arab diplomat. "He has to be defeated. That's the only way to break his image of invincibility." Saddam's smartest course might be to do nothing, to wait for the forces arrayed against him to splinter. "We have to provoke him," the Arab diplomat tells an American. "We can't give him time. As soon as you are able to deal him a devastating blow, you should do it."

By next month, the Americans will be as ready as they're ever going to be, with about 125,000 combat troops and support personnel in the theater. Bush ordered a fourth aircraft-carrier battle group to the

region. With the airlift of ground combat troops running far behind schedule, he commandeered 38 wide-body jets from civilian airlines to serve as transports. The president also prepared to activate thousands of reservists, mostly for duty in the logistical "tail" of the expeditionary force. Privately, American officials conceded

ed that it would be months, at least, before there could be any significant reduction of U.S. forces in the gulf region—and that a complete withdrawal from Saudi Arabia probably would take years.

Already, some of the fighting men were beginning to chafe with impatience. Navy pilots searched the sky over the gulf for

The Blockade Squeeze and . . .

As a U.S.-led blockade tightens the economic screws on Iraq, Saddam Hussein has apparently played a time-honored diplomatic card: hostage-taking. A look at the blockade and how U.S. forces might attempt to rescue the captives:

IRAQI OIL: Petroleum is Iraq's most significant revenue source, accounting for 99 percent of its foreign trade. With Iraq's pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia shut off, accessible oil ports blockaded and most Western nations participating in an embargo, Saddam will soon become desperate for cash.

PERSIAN GULF: Shipping traffic to Iraq and Kuwait on the Persian Gulf has come to a standstill since the blockade was announced. President Bush ordered the 22 U.S. warships in the region—eight in the Persian Gulf, the nine-ship aircraft carrier Independence group in the Gulf of Oman and a five-ship Red Sea flotilla led by the carrier Eisenhower—to use the "minimum force necessary" to intercept vessels bound for Iraq. If a ship fails to stop when asked, a U.S. commander can

lob a warning shot across its bow or board the boat to disable its engines. By the weekend, the Navy had stopped at least four Iraqi ships, firing warnings at two that refused to be searched. Both gave way.

AQABA: Until the Pentagon placed the Jordanian Red Sea port under the blockade, it served as Iraq's last trade link to the outside world. Although little Iraqi oil is trucked to Aqaba for export along the road from Baghdad, Saddam has counted on the port as an inlet for a more vital commodity: food. Iraq imports some 75 percent of its basic foodstuffs. Saddam may hope his overtures to Iran open a new route. A U.S. warship is also checking vessels entering the Suez Canal, perhaps in fear that Saddam will order an Iraqi ship to scuttle itself in the channel, making the passage unnavigable for months.



SCOTT APPLEWHITE—AP

A member of a Sheridan tank crew drinks mineral water to guard against dehydration

Iraqi warplanes, returning disappointed to the carrier *Independence*. Air Force pilots based in Saudi Arabia played games of dare and double-dare with Iraqi planes. The Iraqis flew their fighters toward the edge of Saudi airspace. The Americans scrambled their F-15s, the fire-control radar "locking on" to the potential intruders. So far, the

Iraqis were shying away. "I sure would like to give Saddam Hussein a big kick in the ass," an F-14 pilot on the *Independence* told *Newsweek's* Ray Wilkinson.

The Iraqis *talked* a good fight. An Iraqi newspaper boasted that U.S. planes "will fall down like dead sparrows," and said that if any pilots try to parachute to safety,

their "bodies will be torn into pieces wherever they fall, so that their souls will go to hell." Fat chance. "When the Iraqi pilots see the Americans facing them in Saudi Arabia, their knees start shaking," said Benny Peled, a former commander of the Israeli Air Force. "If given free rein, the American pilots will fly like cowboys and eat the Iraqi Air Force for breakfast."

Without resorting to force, Bush hoped to knock Iraq out quickly by imposing his own naval blockade to enforce the U.N. economic sanctions. In addition, his military advisers feared that shipments of munitions might get through the net, or that some Iraqi-bound ship might scuttle itself in the Suez Canal, depriving U.S. warships of the vital waterway. The U.N. Security Council had not voted a blockade and was not likely to do so until it saw evidence of sanction-busting. But as one U.S. official put it, "If you set up an embargo and then don't stop ships to look at what they're carrying, what are you there for?"

Kuwait's call for help: Bush used a deft but debatable legal justification for his blockade. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows nations to act in self-defense when attacked and to seek help from others. Washington wrote a letter for the Kuwaiti emir to sign, in which he asked the United States to help him by blockading Iraq. The emir goofed when he sent a similar letter to other nations, inviting them to sign up. He left out the paragraph mentioning that the United States would be in charge of the



War Options

To keep U.S. and other captives in Kuwait from being used as human shields at Iraqi military bases, Bush may make a rescue attempt. Freeing the thousands of Westerners and others in Kuwait City requires a full-scale invasion.

1 By night, a paratrooper assault would attempt to "kick in the door." Slipped in beforehand, special forces units, such as Navy SEALs, would overwhelm Iraqi guards and try to free hostages.

2 More heavily armed Marine amphibious units would land from the sea, possibly backed by aerial gunships to lay down fire on Iraqi strongholds.

3 Four Iraqi armored divisions north of Kuwait would move on the capital. Without tanks of their own, U.S. forces would probably try to hold the line at the al-Matla ridge, northwest of the city, supported by fire from A-10 Thunderbolts and other attack jets.



DENNIS BRACK—POOL

Sporting camouflage gear—and digging in under a camouflage tent—in the Saudi desert

operation. Sources said some nations—Australia was one—agreed to join the blockade and then were taken aback when they learned that the Yanks expected to be in overall command.

Bush's unilateral action did not sit well with some nations, such as the Soviet Union and France, that had given crucial support to his original call for economic sanctions. "This problem will not be solved without U.N. involvement," said another critic, Democratic Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York. "It has to be done under U.N. auspices and under a U.N. mandate." The embargo had been holding up reasonably well before the blockade was imposed. Ships carrying cargoes for Iraq were turned back by many countries, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

One question mark was Jordan. Its ruler, King Hussein, said he would honor the U.N. embargo but complained about the economic damage to his country, which depends heavily on its trade with Iraq. When Hussein rushed off to Kennebunkport to explain, rumors circulated that he was carrying a message from Saddam. The king arrived in Maine with empty pockets. "I did not bring any message," he told reporters. Bush sent him off with nothing to show for his visit. "The president was not going to give him the peace of mind he wanted," said a senior administration official.

Where's Saddam? Saddam Hussein may also be in low spirits. All week, there were no live appearances by the dictator on Iraqi TV. Even his most dramatic announcements were read for him by the same bland announcer. Was Saddam hiding out? The world could only speculate. The Egyptians, waging a war of words with Baghdad, did so with a vengeance, publishing on their official news service a thinly sourced article claiming that Saddam had survived a coup

attempt by "a number of close associates." U.S. officials thought Saddam had ample reason to fear for his personal safety, but they had no independent confirmation of the coup report, and no particular reason to think that the regime might be shaky.

Saddam displayed some strategic daring in the sudden rapprochement with Iran. In a "Dear Brother" letter to Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, he offered to give back the 700 square miles of territory he had conquered in his eight-year war with Iran and to free all prisoners of war. Saddam thus gave up everything he had fought for, but he gained the freedom to concentrate on his new enemy to the south. He probably was hoping that the Iranians would help him break the sanctions. The outlook for that was uncertain. Iran showed no sudden love for Iraq; it still opposed the invasion of Kuwait. But Iran also bitterly resented the U.S. intervention.

Saddam's intentions concerning the hostages were harder to read. "Things were getting very ominous there," a middle-aged British woman said after her escape from Kuwait City to Saudi Arabia. "Eventually we were all going to be rounded up, so we decided to leave." She and three relatives escaped across the desert in a four-wheel-drive vehicle, with Iraqi troops shooting at them on the border. She said some Westerners were now being hidden by Kuwaitis who had formed small underground groups to resist the Iraqis. "We never thought the Kuwaitis had it in them," she said, "but they are prepared to fight back."

On Thursday, Iraqi military authorities in Kuwait ordered American and British citizens to report to one of two hotels. Fearing deportation to Iraq, most of them refused to show up. Only five Americans assembled at the International Hotel, where there were no Iraqi officials on hand to receive them. In Baghdad, the omens were

less benign. About three dozen American "restrictees" suddenly disappeared from the Al Rashid Hotel, where they had been sequestered in relative comfort. U.S. intelligence received a report that they might have been taken by bus to another hotel, the Melia-Mansour, where British citizens were being held. When a U.S. official went to that hotel, he was denied entry.

Bargaining chips: Last Saturday, the British Foreign Office said it had confirmed that 40 Britons, five Americans, four Germans and one French citizen had been moved from Kuwaiti hotels to undisclosed locations. Iraq's ambassador to France said some foreigners had been "distributed in strate-

gic installations in Iraq, starting all the way from the north of Iraq to the south." Did Saddam mean to use the hostages as human shields? Some Western officials thought he was merely hanging on to the foreigners for possible use later on as bargaining chips in negotiation. In this view, Saddam would sit tight and try to wait out the embargo. Others sensed a more malignant intention. An Arab diplomat who sympathizes with Iraq thought Saddam was using the hostages to bait Bush into attacking him. Then Saddam would counter by attacking Israel, hoping to unite the Arabs behind him against the Israelis and Americans. "Israel is Saddam's way out of this," argued the diplomat.

The next move was up to Bush. He could try to turn the tables on Saddam by waiting him out in hopes of a peaceful resolution. That would require the president to hold together somehow the broad but fragile coalition that produced the U.N. embargo and persuaded Egypt, Morocco and Syria to help defend Saudi Arabia. But after his meeting with King Hussein, Bush said he did not have "a feeling of hope" that Iraq would withdraw its troops from Kuwait or that a diplomatic solution would soon be found. Bush gave no ground on his original objectives, including restoration of Kuwait's emir; many presidential advisers still hoped that the crisis would lead eventually to Saddam's downfall. For that ambitious agenda, it may be that the only workable option is force—or the imminent threat of it. That left many Americans with the queasy feeling of a drift toward war, and the grim suspicion that even victory could come very dear.

RUSSELL WATSON with RAY WILKINSON in Saudi Arabia, JOHN BARRY and MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington, ANN MCDANIEL in Kennebunkport, ROD NORDLAND in the Persian Gulf and bureau reports

Bush's Hostage Dilemma

To let his hands be tied—or risk a bloodbath

It is the most difficult choice faced by any president since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. John F. Kennedy, at least, had 13 days to decide what to do about Soviet missiles in Cuba. George Bush may not have as long to decide what to do about the hostages in the Middle East. He is at the critical moment in his presidency, and the consequences of his decision will affect not just the Americans held captive in Kuwait and Iraq, but millions of people around the world.

In many ways, Bush is faced with a no-win choice. If he waits and watches, the hostage situation may just deteriorate further. He is faced with an unpredictable and ruthless leader who is perfectly capable of committing atrocious acts. Saddam Hussein could easily decide to round up the 600 Americans already in Iraq and place them at the military bases that are the most predictable targets for a U.S. pre-emptive attack. He may well decide to round up the 2,500 Americans now in Kuwait and ship them off to Iraq to serve as pawns in a grotesque Holy War. Bush has a vivid memory of Jimmy Carter's paralysis during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980. White House aides say they dread a replay of that ordeal, of the pictures of blindfolded hostages, their anxious families waiting at home, the television anchormen intoning, "This is Day 52..."

Bush may have to move fast to head off that grim scenario. But if he strikes militarily, the consequences could be far grimmer. A "surgical" hostage-rescue attempt is an impossibility—there are too many hostages and they are spread out in too many places. Any attempted rescue would surely provoke an all-out and bloody war with Iraq that would leave thousands of American soldiers and civilians of many nations dead or wounded. The United States has the power to "win" such a war, but the world would wonder at the cost.

It is impossible (and unwise) to predict precisely how the United States would attack. But by looking at past U.S. operations and assessing what is publicly known about the forces available,



The president takes a call on the golf course

a scenario can be constructed: U.S. forces would try to seize and hold Kuwait City. The United States would seek not only to free American hostages, but citizens of other countries as well—as many as possible of the thousands of foreigners now scattered about the city. It is likely that the United States would storm the city by air and sea. The 82nd Airborne Division would parachute in from their bases in Saudi Arabia. Lightly armed, their role would be, as military planners say, to "kick in the door." To sustain the invasion, they would have to be quickly bolstered by an amphibious assault from the sea. By the end of this week, Bush will have in place some 33,000 Marines to launch such an attack.

The invasion would almost certainly come at night. During its midnight invasion of Panama last December, the United States was able to throw 4,500 airborne

troops into battle with modest casualties. An assault on Kuwait City would be far more costly. It is not known how many defenders Iraq has there, but they are certainly more numerous and deadly than the Panama Defense Forces. In the invasions of Panama and Grenada, the United States used special forces—Navy SEALs and Delta Force—to rescue civilians or attack key targets. These forces would likely be slipped into Kuwait City before H-Hour to perform similar roles. If the Pentagon can get them to the gulf in time, attack helicopters and fixed-wing AC-130 gunships could perform an essential mission, hosing fire down on Iraqi strongholds.

Once the city was secured, it would have to be defended. Iraqi tanks would pour down from the north. There is a natural barrier just northwest of the city called the al-Matla ridge, but U.S. forces would have to hold it without tanks, since it is unlikely that heavy armor could be inserted in time. The best hope is air power. After fierce dogfights with the Iraqi Air Force, the United States would likely gain control of the

skies. U.S. attack planes—Saudi-based A-10s and carrier-borne A-6s—would be free to attack Iraqi tanks, although whether they could kill them fast enough to stop the Iraqi columns is uncertain. The United States would also probably use B-52s based in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to rain bombs on Iraqi forces.

The damage would be immense. The United States might have to destroy Kuwait—its oil refineries, its port and much of its capital city—to save it. But the carnage would not end there. An invasion of Kuwait means total war. The Iraqis might take the opportunity to lunge into Saudi Arabia, toward the oilfields and air bases at Dhahran 200 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. The United States would try to wipe out Iraq's war-making capabilities by carpet-bombing Iraqi military installations—missile bases, airfields, weapons factories, ammo dumps. The 600 Americans in Iraq could well be sacrificed in the process.

That is a heavy burden for a president to bear. Bush has shown a willingness to use force in the past. But never have the risks been so great and the potential consequences so awful.

EVAN THOMAS with JOHN BARRY in Washington

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Where the Americans Are



COURTESY CNN

■ An Iraqi spokesman called the embargo an "act of war" and Baghdad threatened to scatter the 600 Americans in Iraq.

■ Of those, 35 were moved to a secret location.

■ An additional 2,500 were being detained in Kuwait.

Fighting in the Desert

The rules of warfare change drastically when it's 110 degrees in the shade

The first thing soldiers from the 82nd Airborne noticed when they arrived in the Middle East is that the sand isn't the same all over the world. "Heck, I've dug foxholes in the desert back home, but this is different," said one paratrooper. "This sand is treacherous—it falls back on top of you as fast as you can dig it." As a result, some U.S. troops hunkering down in the Saudi Arabian desert are bringing their own sandbags with them to build walled fighting holes, rather than try to dig deep into the shifting natural stuff. "It's just one massive sand trap out there," marveled Col. Ron Rokosz, commander of the division's 325th Regiment.

American troops have not fought a desert war since the North African campaigns of 1942-43. They will have to learn fast if they are to stand a chance in a part of the world where the environment can be every bit as formidable as the enemy. Fierce desert winds can kick up sudden dust storms, corroding equipment and blotting out visibility. Extreme ground temperatures can bend the gun barrels of tanks and artillery pieces, impeding firing accuracy. Heat waves rippling over the desert surface can disrupt delicate sighting mechanisms and create optical illusions. "Your eyes play tricks on you all the time," says one Israeli combat veteran. Tank commanders have been known to fire on everything from their own fuel trucks to Bedouin homes because they misidentified targets in the superheated air.

The most delicate piece of machinery is the soldier himself. Humans simply don't function well in heat over 100 degrees Fahrenheit—particularly those who are used to cooler climes. Daytime temperatures in the gulf have ranged as high as 120 degrees since the Americans landed. Medics reported surprisingly few heat casualties—but ground fighting had not begun.

The first rule of the desert is to drink vast quantities of water—as much as six gallons a day. But transporting it poses logistical problems. At eight pounds per gallon, soldiers can't carry a day's water rations. Supply posts with "water buffaloes"—flatbed trucks containing huge bladders of water—can't fall too far behind the front lines. Commanders must refrain from pushing their men too long or too hard, and precautions against the sun are critical. Soldiers learn fast that stripping to their underwear is counterproductive. Most desert vet-

erans don't even roll up their sleeves, since any excess exposure hastens dehydration.

Saddam Hussein's implied threat to use chemical weapons sorely complicates clothing requirements. Protective suits weigh up to 15 pounds each and can't be worn more than about 10 hours, since they contain no means to eliminate body wastes (chart). That now seems optimistic. Watching them in drills in the Saudi heat, some experts think the suits are too hot and too heavy to be worn for more than an hour at a time. Even the antidote kits to counteract nerve agents pose a Catch-22 in the desert. Used preventively, drugs such as atropine can hamper sweating and salivation, in-

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creasing the risk of heat stroke.

In the event of a chemical attack, soldiers and support personnel must also wear protective gloves. While nerve gases dissipate quickly in the desert, oily mustard gas leaves a film on exposed surfaces that can linger for weeks, causing bad blisters on bare hands. Decontaminating

tanks and aircraft requires hosing them with scarce water. Already, Army officials realize they have grossly underestimated the water-supply problem. Lacking air-portable desalination plants, they may have to bring in barges loaded with fresh water.

In fact, more of everything is needed for fighting in the desert—including extra fuel and extra maintenance time. During the



An M1 tank on maneuvers at the Army's National Training Center in the Mojave Desert

Iran-Iraq war, the dust blowing off the desert was so fine that it passed through filtration systems on U.S. ships escorting Kuwaiti tankers. Sailors had to fasten cheesecloth over the air intakes and change them regularly. The dust also abraded machinery; helicopter blades and gears wore out three times faster than usual.

Sitting ducks: Tanks operating in the desert must be outfitted with sand shields, cooling systems and special transmissions reducing top speed to 40 mph for greater maneuverability. They, too, must be checked and cleaned daily. "An armored offensive in desert conditions can be suicidal unless your vehicles are in perfect order," warns one Israeli. If a tank bogs down in the sand, three more tanks with steel cables may be needed to free it—provided none of them gets stuck in the process.

Iraqi commanders discovered one way to beat the sand-trap problem during the war with Iran: they settled their Soviet-made tanks into shallow foxholes, using them as stationary artillery pieces. Some Israeli military observers think Saddam's troops may use this tactic again, making them sitting ducks for American airstrikes. But U.S. forces may not be so lucky. A smarter

strategy for the Iraqis would be to keep their tanks rolling in loose formation, generating dust clouds as they go. U.S. and Saudi pilots would find it extremely hard to identify targets in such conditions; even flying through the clouds at the low level needed for tank strikes is risky.

U.S. infantry commanders might do well to wait until dark to move. Given the superior sighting capabilities of U.S. tanks, "We own the night," boasts Col. J. W. Thurman, director of command and staff at the U.S. Army Armor School in Fort Knox, Ky. "It's our time to go out and hunt." Moving in darkness is also easier on soldiers—even though temperatures in the gulf can remain above 100 degrees long after midnight. But such ploys are hardly new to the Iraqis. Most of the fighting with Iran took place at night, with both sides taking "tea breaks" from dawn to dusk in the summer.

The U.S. troops being rushed to the Persian Gulf are not completely unfamiliar with desert-fighting constraints. In the last two years, virtually every U.S. Army unit has rotated through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., practicing maneuvers in the Mojave Desert. The terrain, the heat and the lack of water are quite similar to the conditions in the Middle East. U.S. Marines train specifically for desert engagements at the nearby Twenty-nine Palms Marine Corps Base in exercises integrating airborne and ground units.

At both facilities, soldiers are taught to make use of the limited cover the landscape provides, hiding in folds and depressions and using shadows as camouflage. Officers learn to recognize signs of heat exhaustion, and force their troops to consume water with "command drink-ins" even when they aren't thirsty. Both camps also subject troops to "gas" attacks, substituting tear gas for chemical weaponry. At Fort Irwin, soldiers are even shot at with laser-beam "bullets" in a sort of battle tag. "Out here, you get the chance to die once a day," says Army public-affairs officer Maj. John Wagstaffe. "Hopefully, you'll learn not to die in combat."

How well such efforts have prepared American troops to fight in a faraway coun-

An Anti-Gas Uniform

Despite the intense heat, U.S. soldiers may have to wear added layers of heavy gear for protection against Iraq's chemical weapons.



HELMET COVER

GAS MASK

WATER: Two 2-quart canteens, which must be replenished often.

DETECTOR STRIPS: Designed to show red polka dots when exposed to invisible chemical gases.

GLOVES: Impermeable rubber over a layer of cotton.

OVERGARMENT: An outer shell that repels liquid, worn over a charcoal-impregnated inner coat that absorbs dangerous chemicals.

BOOTS: A rubber outerboot with non-slip soles, over a regulation pair.



PHOTOS BY DENNIS BRACK—POOL

ANTIDOTE KIT: Soldiers are instructed to inject themselves with two drugs—one to counter poison gas, one to revive body functions—with a needle big enough to puncture all the layers of clothing.

try, against an experienced desert fighting force, remains to be seen. The campaign may turn less on weapons and training than on the whims of wind and shifting sand. One thing is clear already: "Operation Desert Shield" is an unusually appropriate name for a contest in which U.S. troops may have to work just as hard to shield themselves from the elements as they do to counter the Iraqi threat.

MELINDA BECK with RAY WILKINSON in Saudi Arabia, THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem, JOHN BARRY in Washington, ANDREW MURR in Los Angeles and MIKE MASON in Atlanta



LEIF SKOOGFORS—WOODFIN CAMP

where the terrain is much like the Middle East



NABIL ISMAIL—AFP

Pro-Saddam demonstrators burning the American flag in Jordan last week

King, Beggarman, Hero and Thief

Why many Arabs see Saddam as their champion

BY CHRISTOPHER DICKEY

A common theme runs through "A Thousand and One Nights," a favorite book in Baghdad. The beggar becomes a king, the king a beggar, and thieves are the heroes of the slums. For many Arabs, Saddam Hussein has brought these fairy tales, written more than half a millennium ago, to life. Since his invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi leader has courted the poor and dispossessed of the historical "Arab nation" that stretches from the Strait of Hormuz to the Rock of Gibraltar. In response to his call, protesters have poured into the streets of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, damning America and singing the praises of Saddam Hussein. Some mothers are proudly bestowing the name Saddam on newborn sons.

For Americans appalled at Saddam's record of brutality against both countryman and neighbor, the outpouring of sup-

port is a puzzling spectacle. But the Arab in the street often sees little sin, and more than a little justice, in the displacement of a Kuwaiti royal family grown rich beyond their wildest dreams of avarice. Thousands of them have labored as menials among the pampered elite of the Persian Gulf. While their leaders toe the U.N. line and support the trade embargo on Iraq, many Arabs have watched with glee as Saddam takes on the world's mightiest military.

Saddam's appeal goes beyond envy to touch the historical core of Arab malaise, the sense that a magnificent past has given way to a demeaning present. The Arabs have a history in this century they would rather not remember, but cannot forget, a common heritage of defeat and humiliation (box). They yearn for the time when Salah al-Din drove the crusaders from their shores, long before the succession of betrayals by onetime friends in the West,

and defeat after defeat at the hands of Israel. Their greatest leader of the century, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, was destroyed by the 1967 war that lasted less than a week. Who would call Saddam a hero? Only a people who have not seen one for a very long time.

In his own country the Iraqi president has long attempted to present himself as all things to all people. The posters that plaster his capital portray him, variously, as a conquering warrior and a humble pilgrim at Mecca. Now, after waging relentless war on religious dissidents and squandering half a million Iraqi lives in an eight-year fight to break the fundamentalist tide coming from Iran, he has raised the banner of Islam in his showdown with the United States. To Teheran, in the name of "God most great," he offered last week to surrender his few territorial gains from the gulf war. He accused the Saudis, his new enemies, of surrendering Is-

lam's most sacred shrines, Mecca and Medina, to the American troops massing on their sands.

Nowhere are his supporters more enthusiastic than among the Palestinian diaspora. Palestinian militants march through West Bank towns chanting "Saddam we are with you until victory" and "Death to America." Some call on him to attack Israel with chemical weapons. Saddam's implausible offer last week—leaving Kuwait in exchange for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories—offered a cruel glimmer of hope to a people facing Israeli fire-

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power with rocks and pistols. "Everybody is moving to evict Iraq from Kuwait and to restore territorial integrity, whereas U.N. Resolution 242 against the occupation of this land by Israel is dying," says Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij. "The Americans are protecting American interests in the gulf but doing nothing here because we have no oil."

In Jordan, where half of the population is Palestinian, the streets pulsate with the excitement of Saddam's stand. "Everyone was in the cinema asleep, not watching the film because it was slow and boring," says Moness Razzaz, a Jordanian writer whose father lived his final years under house arrest by Saddam's regime. "And then suddenly there was action and everyone woke up and clapped." Razzaz, paradoxically, is among those applauding. "If I have to choose between democracy in Iraq and allowing foreign powers to dominate our lives," says Razzaz, "I will back Iraq and Saddam 100 percent."

But among the Arabs who know Saddam best, there are few illusions. The Egyptians who, by the millions, have labored in Iraq's fields, cleaned Baghdad's floors and been drafted in Saddam's wars, are not among his fans. Today they are signing up for the Saudi Army. "Saddam Hussein is the Arab Hitler," says one young man enlisting at the Saudi Embassy in Cairo. Some, to be sure, are attracted by reported rumors of generous salaries. But others are fighting for their faith. "We want to defend Mecca," says Omer Abdel Hamid, a teacher from the deeply religious province of Faiyum.

Upper hand: Most Arab leaders have turned against Saddam—in some cases out of personal animus. Syrian President Hafez Assad, whose ambition to lead the Arab nation is no less intense than Saddam's, cannot bear to see his rival gain the upper hand. Morocco's King Hassan II cannot afford to see the legitimacy of a royal house be crushed by Iraq's grand slam.

The Arab leaders who have refused to confront Saddam are in an awkward spot. Jordan's King Hussein, an old friend of the West who is totally dependent on Iraq for oil and much of his trade, has been caught in a hopeless squeeze. Arab sources in Europe with close ties to the palace say even the Jordanian intelligence forces are divided between those in the civilian service, who favor Saddam, and those in the military, who oppose him. The king, says one Arab intelligence source, "is between the devil and the deep blue sea": Saddam Hussein and the American fleet. Although the king promised George Bush last week to observe the U.N. embargo, some European analysts

thought this was a dangerous move. Francis Heisbourg of London's International

Institute for Strategic Studies says America would be doing the king a favor by imposing a selective blockade on the port of Aqaba: "It would be easier for King Hussein to be able to say, 'It's not our fault'."

The Palestine Liberation Organization's chairman, Yasir Arafat, who hasn't condemned the Kuwait invasion, seems to have thrown his elusive presence behind Saddam. But some PLO officials feel the situation is hopeless. Says one: "If Saddam wins we become his servants, and if he loses we become the servants of Israel."

For many in the region, a new sense of

humiliation already is growing. Once again Arabs are pitted against Arabs, powerless to act in concert as the West takes control of their oil and their fate. If there is one point on which most Arabs may come to agree, it is that both Bush and Saddam ultimately hurt their cause. As an Egyptian technician put it after fleeing Iraq last week, Saddam is to blame for "bringing the American wolf among the Arab sheep."

with RAY WILKINSON in Dhahran,
JEFFREY BARTHOLET in Amman,
THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem,
CAROL BERGER in Cairo, SANA ISSA in Beirut
and ROD NORDLAND in Dubai

A Heritage of Humiliation and Defeat

Saddam's appeal touches the core of Arab malaise—the sense that a magnificent past has given way to a demeaning present. Some 20th-century setbacks:

1948 Arabs reject a U.N. plan to partition Palestine into two states. When the Israeli state is proclaimed on May 14, the Arab nations declare war. They lose, leaving Israel with more territory than it had received under the U.N. plan.



BURT GLINN—MAGNUM

Israelis with Egyptian POWs, 1956

1956 When Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal, Israel invades the Sinai with the support of Britain and France, which want to regain control of the waterway. U.S. and U.N. pressure subsequently forces Israel to return the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.



LEONARD FREED—MAGNUM

Israelis marching on Jerusalem, 1967

1967 Rumors of an upcoming Israeli attack on Syria leads Nasser to mass troops at the Israeli border and to close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. On June 5, Israel launches large-scale attacks, destroying most of the Arab forces in less than a week. Israel captures the Sinai, the West Bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.

1973 By 1973, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's new president, is persuaded by other Arab states to go to war with Israel. Egypt and Syria launch their attack on Yom Kippur. Although the Arabs make greater military gains than in previous wars with Israel, they do not emerge victorious and Israel retains control of the disputed territories.



CHRIS STEELE-PERKINS—MAGNUM

Lebanese refugees in West Beirut, 1982

1982 PLO shelling of northern Israel from southern Lebanon leads to a full-scale Israeli invasion. Israeli bombardments devastate many Lebanese towns and villages; civilian casualties in the first fortnight reach 14,000. U.S. mediation produces a PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, followed by an Israeli withdrawal in 1984.

Where's the New 'Superpower'?

Japan keeps asking for a global role, but in this crisis it's yet to be seen

Since the mid-1980s, the foreign-policy establishment in Tokyo has repeated the same mantra: "Japan needs to play a global political role commensurate with its economic strength." With the crisis in the gulf, those aspirations are being put to their severest test yet—and Tokyo is laboring to meet it. While thousands of U.S. troops sit boiling in the Saudi Arabian sun, the Japanese government is fitfully trying to decide, as Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe put it last week, "what concrete steps we can take to promote peace and stability in this region." Few Western diplomats in Tokyo doubt Japan's sincerity. But if the government of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu doesn't decide soon how to help out in the gulf, they warn, it could risk a potentially serious schism with the United States.

**CRISIS
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When Saddam Hussein overran Kuwait, Tokyo did, after dithering a bit, close ranks with the West and impose economic sanctions against Iraq. That included a refusal to import any of its oil, a significant sacrifice for a nation that gets 12 percent of all its supplies from Kuwait and Iraq. Not long ago that move alone would have probably satisfied world opinion. But policymakers in Tokyo quickly found out that in the post-cold-war world, where it is supposed to have emerged as a new "superpower," much more is expected.

In Washington, airwaves and newspaper columns buzzed with the notion that Tokyo wasn't doing enough. On CNN's "Crossfire," conservative commentator Patrick Buchanan told a hapless Japanese foreign-policy analyst that Americans were about to come home "in body bags"

defending Japan's oil. Even President Bush reminded Tokyo that the game has gotten more expensive and gently prodded Kaifu to contribute financial aid to countries in the region suffering from the ban on trade with Iraq.

Kaifu was in fact weighing a variety of options, nearly all of which Japan's allies would applaud. But they were not yet government policy, and, as Foreign Ministry spokesman Watanabe conceded, time was "running short." By the weekend, the labyrinthine route to "consensus" in Japan had led to little except frustration. Why it's so torturous for Tokyo to live up to its rhetoric about global aspirations becomes clear from a quick review of the options the government was said to be considering:

Join a multinational force. Japan's Constitution clearly rules out sending soldiers into combat to "settle international disputes." No one outside Japan expects that. Yet it's

Scrambling the TV Anchors: What Gets Lost

Ted Koppel played a practical joke on Dan Rather last week in Baghdad. Koppel, who had arrived in Iraq first, left a scrawled note on the desk in the American Embassy that he and Rather temporarily shared. It contained Saddam Hussein's name, a place and a time—suggesting that Koppel had an exclusive interview. He didn't, of course, as Rather quickly realized. No one did. Camera-shy Saddam was hiding out, letting a dapper spokesman read his vitriolic TV speeches for him. But even if he had talked to Ted or Dan, the journalistic coup would have been more apparent than real. As Koppel admitted, the Iraqi government only invited the American reporters to Baghdad in order to get its self-serving message out.

That wasn't much consolation to NBC and CNN, neither of which made it into Iraq at all last week. They "lost" the

first battle of the media war, at least as it is now defined. In recent years, coverage of these fast-breaking global events has replaced political conventions as the testing ground for TV news—and not always to good effect. International TV reportage is now more nimble, but often less informed than in the past. Instead of investing in long-term coverage of a region, which pays off in penetrating reporting, the networks slash their overseas bureaus and all but ignore whole areas of the world until a crisis erupts. Then they parachute in big-name talent. NBC at first tried to avoid playing the usual game of "anchors away." But by midweek Tom Brokaw, too, was en route to Saudi Arabia.

Even when the anchors are at home, they can change the dynamics of a story in unsettling ways. Koppel was entirely right to step in and in-



BARRY IVERSON—POOL


Rather aboard a U.S. carrier

sist that the Americans held in Kuwait and Baghdad be called hostages instead of "detainees" or some other euphemism. But in his riveting "Nightline" appearance upon his return from Jordan, the weary anchor (a "guest" of substitute anchor Barbara

Walters) crossed the line from asking tough questions to delivering a diplomatic tongue-lashing to the Iraqi ambassador.

For TV, the real problem with the gulf story is that the pictures stink. A little "bang bang," to use the industry vernacular, would change that in a hurry—assuming, of course, anyone would be allowed to cover it. Rather and ABC News's Forrest Sawyer have been forced to report from Iraq mostly by telephone. Unfortunately, the Iraqis aren't the only ones who restrict the freedom of reporters. American pool reporters at military installations in Saudi Arabia are complaining that both the Pentagon and Saudi officials are denying necessary access to the story. (One reason is that Iraqi officials can see it all via CNN.) Should shooting start, there was no guarantee it would be televised. Like the Falklands, Grenada and Panama, this war may turn out to be off the record.

JONATHAN ALTER



The sudden leap in gas prices has led to charges of gouging and fed worries about inflation

Hunkering Down for the Economic Siege

A guide to surviving an oil crisis and a recession

BY JANE BRYANT QUINN

The prospect of war wasn't the only thing making Americans jittery last week. For the economy at home, all the indicators continued to point the wrong way. Rising gasoline prices brought on by the Iraqi crisis caught the most flak. But the greater danger lay in the risk that long-term interest rates would continue to climb. Inflation swelled almost to 6 percent, the dollar collapsed and a sinkhole opened under the price of stocks.

For savers and investors, it was worry time. But wondering "where should my money be now?" is to ask the wrong question. The right question is, "how should my savings be arranged so that every new crisis isn't going to scare me to death?"

The hedgehog response is to roll your money into a ball and not leave the bank until the year 2001. But that strategy carries its own risks. Inflation devours fixed-income investments. In real terms, you may never become a penny richer.

A smarter choice is to diversify your savings and investments and then pretty much leave them alone. This lacks the fascination of chasing the oil stocks or the Mexico Fund. But wasn't it Oscar Wilde who said that it's better to have a per-

manent income than to be fascinating? For the millions of Americans who are worrying about how the gulf crisis should affect their economic planning, here are a few tips:

Your home: A house is the rock on which your security is built, and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) are still going cheap. Rising inflation does more damage to long-term interest rates than to shorter ones.

One-year ARMs continue to be priced at around 8.2 percent, reports Paul Havemann of HSH Associates in Butler, N.J.—just about the same as before the Iraqi invasion. ARMs are generally cheaper than fixed-rate loans over the years that you'll own the house.

With house prices falling in so many states, the new wisdom says that it's smarter to rent than to buy. Maybe so—if you invest all the money you didn't invest in the house, and if your investment earns an attractive return, and if you won't rent for very long. That's too many ifs for my taste—especially if you can buy for 10 or 15 percent less than houses cost last year. "The longer you live in a house, the greater the advantage of being an owner," says Timothy Kochis, national director of personal financial planning for the accounting firm, Deloitte & Touche. When you retire, there's no cheaper way to live than in a paid-up home of your own.

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Your job: Even before the world's oil supplies were put at risk, slowed growth was pushing Americans out of work. So how to protect yourself against a sudden layoff? The classic advice is to keep three month's take-home pay in a money-market mutual fund. Funds are paying an average of 7.8 percent—a full 1.3 percentage points more than you'll get from a bank money-market account. As a practical matter, the only way most of us build such a fund is through automatic savings like payroll deductions.

If you have kids in college, you have probably doubled over in helpless laughter. An emergency fund? When the bursar's office has a lien on your take-home pay? Having been there myself, let me humbly offer an alternative: a paid-up credit card, that you can borrow against in a pinch.

If your company offers a tax-deductible retirement savings plan, stash away every dollar you can. These are the best personal-finance deals in America today. If you leave your job, that money usually goes with you. If you've worked for the company long enough, you can also walk away with any matching funds that your employer put in.

Your energy costs: Just when you thought it was safe to buy a gas guzzler, along came Saddam Hussein to put sand in your tank. But despite all the protests over gouging at the pump, gasoline is cheap. Driving today costs you 28 percent less per mile than it did before the 1973 embargo, adjusted for inflation and for the greater gas-efficiency of cars. Gasoline would be a bargain even if the government raised the gas tax.

Should you fill your heating-oil tank now, before winter comes? Either way, you're speculating on the price. Oil might cost more in October, or it might cost less. Whether from sloth or speculation, my own tank stands half empty.

Your savings: An all-weather plan asks first what your savings are for. The answer will tell you what kinds of investments will serve you the best. For example, any money that you absolutely must have within four years (like your son's freshman-year tuition or your daughter's wedding fund) should be kept in a perfectly safe place. And I haven't picked four years whimsically. On average, that's how long it has taken for stocks that have dropped to make up all the ground they lost.

It is not safe to put this money

into a mutual fund that buys long-term bonds. When interest rates rise, as they recently have, bond funds lose value. Safety-first money needs a guarantee. For a college bill due in three years, consider a three-year Treasury note at 8.2 percent.

Retirement money is something else. You're talking 20 to 30 years, and on this road, Iraq is probably a pebble you can walk over barefoot. The bulk of your retirement fund (60 percent or more) belongs in well-diversified stocks, even if you're middle-aged. Stocks deliver the best long-term returns, and stock mutual funds catch almost any profits going. If you own one (including the stock fund in your company's retirement plan), it probably has some energy stocks. So you should have made money on the post-invasion rally in oil issues.

Don't look for the same huge returns in the 1990s that you got in the '80s. The 100-year record (chart) shows that 10 fat years are typically followed by 10 leaner ones. At today's interest rates, long-term bonds are looking pretty good, says John Bogle, head

of The Vanguard Group of mutual funds. Putting a little money in bonds (or in your retirement plan's guaranteed-investment contract) helps protect your capital in a year when stocks do poorly.

Or should you quit the stock market entirely, given how truly awful it looks? Maybe so—except that most investors buy and sell at just the wrong times. Essential money shouldn't be in stocks in the first place. Long-term money will probably do just as well if you leave it alone.

Your disaster hedges: Should an all-weather portfolio include gold? Probably not. Last week's gold gains were driven principally by professional hedgers, says London-based precious-metals analyst Philip Taylor, of the brokerage firm S.G. Warburg. They were playing with paper, not accumulating gold itself. Back in the 1970s, gold was your only effective inflation protection, adds August Arace, manager of the Freedom Gold and Government Fund. Today, you get inflation protection and an income, too, just by buying Treasury bills.

Gold will save you if they cart away the U.S. dollar in wheelbarrows. (So will owning foreign currencies.) But as an everyday inflation investment, gold is a bust. Had you bought it in December 1974 when it again became legal for Americans to own, and held it through 1989, your real, after-inflation return would be just about zero, reports Norman Fosback of the Institute for Econometric Research in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

A better form of accident insurance is putting some money in a no-load (no sales charge) short-term bond mutual fund. It yields more income than money funds do, and you don't lose much capital if interest rates rise. If you suddenly should need some cash, and your stocks and long-term bonds are in the cellar, and your banker won't lend again, your house and your spouse have absconded with your bank account, your short-term bond funds are an easy sell. You can buy them from any of the major mutual-fund groups: Scudder, Vanguard, Dreyfus, Fidelity, Rowe Price.

Here, then, is how to manage your money in these times of crisis. As a citizen, you may be outraged and eager for resolution. But once you've laid out a diversified investment plan, the smartest strategy may be not to change a thing.

Associate: VIRGINIA WYLLIE



ALEX QUESADA—MATRIX

A Bear Decade?

History suggests the bullish '80s will give way to 10 years of lean or average stock returns.



SOURCE: CHARLES P. JONES AND JACK W. WILSON, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV.

Why to Fight—And Why Not to

Let's avoid hysteria and focus on U.S. interests

BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

While I support President Bush's courageous decision to defend Saudi Arabia, my greatest fear about the ongoing crisis is that it could get out of hand. The way it has been played in the mass media, and even by some official spokesmen, will create a mass hysteria that could prompt an overreaction to some isolated incident. The spark could then set off a wider flame and result in a massive explosion. Suppose there is a collision between U.S. aircraft and Iraqi aircraft, or some incident on the ground between Iraqi forces and forward-based American forces. Or suppose there is some shooting incident and the process simply escalates. We could then envision not only widening hostilities with rising casualties but an increasing wave of anti-Americanism among the Arab masses, even inside countries with pro-U.S. governments.

Recently I was talking to an Arab ambassador from a country that is participating in our efforts to isolate Iraq and who is very supportive of what we are doing. He told me the masses in his country are seething with hostility toward the United States. Anti-Americanism is very high throughout the Arab world. It is high in Egypt; Mubarak could become vulnerable over time. It is quite high in Saudi Arabia, below the surface. It is even high in countries as far away as Morocco.

That is why it is vital to differentiate between primary goals and secondary, though still important, objectives. Our vital goal is to secure a stable supply of reasonably priced oil. That we can do by protecting Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and by deterring Iraq—doing all of that unilaterally, if necessary. Our secondary objective ought to be getting Iraq to disgorge Kuwait. But that is a goal we have in common with the international community as a whole. Therefore, in my view, we should pursue that aim only in a coalition with the international community. If the U.S. is out in front, there is the very real risk that the confrontation will turn into a wider Arab-American conflict, jeopardizing the more moderate

Arab governments and probably in the end our access to oil.

Economic sanctions may work if we can make them quite tough, but even then an evasion by Iraq is possible. If the U.S. is very much in front of the effort, it will probably create the temptation even in Iran to side with Iraq against the so-called "Great Satan." And if Iran were to become more sympathetic to Iraq in spite of their recent war, it would be very difficult for us to enforce the blockade and



LES STONE—SYGMA

An emotional response is understandable but risky

would make us the object of intensifying Islamic antagonism. At a time when the Islamic world is becoming increasingly preoccupied with the liberation of Muslims in the Soviet Union, it is hardly in our strategic interests to refocus Islamic hostility on the United States.

By the same token, the best hope for freeing detained American citizens is to avoid unnecessary collisions and to not let the U.S. become the spearhead of an effort to bring down Saddam Hussein. Already analogies have been drawn between Hussein and Hitler—a parallel that seems to me really far-fetched. Most people should be aware of the fact that Hitler was the leader of a world power when he set out on his policy of world conquest. Saddam Hussein is the head of a relatively small country, with only 17 million people and no arms industry, which cannot even feed itself and which under no conceivable circumstances can become a dominant world power.

I fully endorse what President Bush has done on the level of defense and de-

terrence. If necessary, the United States should be prepared to fight alone to prevent the Iraqis from expanding into Saudi Arabia. We should also sustain our support for the international community's demand that the Kuwaiti people be freed. But Washington should not be the sole or even predominant enforcer of that effort. I am struck by the fact that other countries like Japan, France and Italy are much more relaxed about this issue than we appear to be. It is very important for us to monitor the reactions in Western Europe and in Japan carefully and to try and keep in step with them.

During the cold war, any regional crisis tended to become simultaneously an East-West conflict. This is why the U.S. had to take the lead role. If the Soviet

Union were still a major sponsor of Iraq, a central American role would still be justified. Precisely because it is now a post-cold-war conflict, with the Soviet Union taking the back seat and in some respects even being supportive, we can also afford to take a back seat where our vital interests are not involved.

For some time to come, we are likely to be faced with an unstable situation in which radical anti-Western regimes such as the ones in Iraq or in Iran try to manipulate the oil issue to our disadvantage. This is why it is important to provide protection for more reasonable oil-producing nations, and to create circumstances in which they are

rewarded for pumping more crude. I include here not only Saudi Arabia and the Emirates but also Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico and Indonesia. We may even be able to create a situation in which the OPEC monopoly is broken to our advantage, provided we don't push our luck and don't get involved in a confrontation which is not really dictated by our immediate needs.

Those of us in the Carter administration learned some lessons from the Iranian hostage crisis. Item one is not to pump up these sorts of confrontations. It doesn't improve chances for a resolution; it merely heightens the level of anxiety and increases the price the hostage-takers try to exact from us. In this case, we should not permit ourselves to be blackmailed or drawn into hostilities that are not in the American interest.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser in the Carter administration and is the author of "The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century."

Newsweek



THE GULF CRISIS
Special Report



Newsweek

HORROR SHOW

Saddam's Prisoners of War



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Staring Down the Bully

**CRISIS
IN THE
GULF**

With a reel of chilly videotape, Saddam Hussein escalates the gulf showdown into a hostage crisis—and sharpens Bush's choice between a waiting game and all-out war

JACQUES LANGSTON—STOCKA

NEWSWEEK—SEPTEMBER 2, 1990 17

Girga Bush has never been known for the "vision thing," but as he trod for bluish last week in his speedboat Fido, he tried to conjure up nothing less than a new world order. Wars are inherently unpredictable, he agreed with his companion, too, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, as they fished the waters off Bush's vacation home in Kennebunkport. The two men knew enough history to understand that blundering, not brilliance, is the norm of generalship: that scared soldiers shoot down their own planes. "Surgical strikes" are usually anything but. In a raid on Iraq, what military planners euphemistically refer to as "collateral damage" could include hundreds of American hostages.

As they bobbed off the coast of Maine, Bush and his adviser tried to peer through the fog of war, to guess at what the battle field would look like after the smoke clears. The chaos they imagined made them seek another course. Bush had reacted almost instinctively when Iraq invaded Kuwait, sounding uncharacteristically Churchillian as he swore, "This will not stand!" War seemed imminent. But since then, the president and his men have mapped out a strategy that they believe will achieve success without resorting to force—at least right away. For the moment, Bush has decided that his foe is power mad, but not suicidally crazy; that Saddam Hussein is not likely to do anything to provoke his own destruction. Bush's advisers calculate that Saddam can be pressured into releasing the hostages and quitting Kuwait. Only if he does act up—by killing his captives or invading Saudi Arabia or another country—will the United States strike.

Based on lofty principles of collective security, the president's grand plan for the post-cold-war world can be summed up simply: Stop International Bullies. Bush counted on plenty of help in this undertaking—from all the industrialized nations, from moderate Arab leaders, even from the long-moribund United Nations. But there was no doubt in Bush's mind about who would be in charge: the world's superpower reborn, the United States.

To that end, the Pentagon continued to flood the Saudi desert with the largest air- and sealift since D-Day: A billion pounds of matériel, including 150,000 bottles of sunscreen and 168,000 chemical-protective suits. At the United Nations the Soviet Union agreed to back a blockade of Iraq with military action, raising hopes that superpower cooperation might make the international organization the force for stability its founders intended. At the weekend U.S. warships were shadowing up to a dozen Iraqi tankers and were poised to disable them. Meanwhile, at "a vital Iraqi installation," Saddam staged a

swamp parade by telling his "guests"—some grim-faced British schoolchildren—that they are not really "human abjects" after all, looking like an undertaker. Saddam assured the children—the same ones he had threatened to starve the week before—that they are "heroes of peace." Then he gathered their families for a tiny little group picture. "such beyond expression," said White House spokesman Martin Fitzwater. On Saturday, Saddam continued to bluster that war would leave "columns of dead bodies." Still, he made no move to take over the foreign embassy in Kuwait that he had ordered shut down, and U.S. officials saw "glimmers" that the Iraqi strongman was looking for a negotiated end to the crisis.

Wars usually seem like better ideas before they are fought than afterward. Boasts of "home by Christmas" dissolve into cries of "never again"; jingoism gives way to recrimination and regret. When the French Army marched off to war against Prussia in 1870, they cried "A Berlin! A Berlin! A Berlin!" Shortly thereafter they were marched back to Paris with their hands up. The U.S. soldiers in the Saudi desert were less belligerently brave; the threat of poison gas was too real for that. But the young Marines waving "Hi Mom!" at the TV cameras seemed more like sophomores suiting up for the Big Game than warriors preparing for battle. Aboard the aircraft carrier USS Independence in the Gulf of Oman, seamen chalked taunting graffiti on bombs and missiles. One read, "This is for you, Saddam, baby."

Awful as war can be, failing to fight can be worse, especially if it means fighting a bigger and nastier war later on. Such is the dilemma Bush faces. Pressuring Saddam out of Kuwait may not be enough. Ultimately, Bush may have to destroy Saddam himself. By sending America to war, he would sacrifice thousands of lives, including those of innocent hostages, as well as inflaming the entire region and alienating international support. Yet if he fails to fight, he may risk a worse conflagration.

Calculated cool: Historically, war leaders are driven more by testosterone and vainglory than wisdom and common sense. Bush has tried hard not to be swayed by emotionalism. At first he refused to even say the word "hostage," and when he did, he vowed not to be intimidated by Saddam's attempt to use Americans and other foreigners as pawns. Apparently, he is prepared to have hostages called by another name: casualties of war. Certainly, he is determined not to be Jimmy Carter, tied up by yellow ribbons in the Rose Garden. But as he "vacationed" at Kennebunkport, his calculated cool was belied by the freneticism of his golf game: an hour and 42 minutes for 18 holes, more hockey than golf.



LEFT: LACOSTE-ADOLPHINE; RIGHT: NEWS-AND-PICS; LEFT: USA-HELIX; RIGHT: USA-HELIX



Equipped by the biggest air- and sea-lift since D-Day—a billion pounds of matériel—Marines try on their gas masks near the oilfields they must defend near Dhahran (above). A military transport plane lands in the Saudi desert (left), while stateside a soldier from the 197th Infantry says goodbye to his child (right).



George Bush has never been known for the "vision thing," but as he trolled for bluefish last week in his speedboat *Fidelity*, he tried to conjure up nothing less than a new world order. Wars are inherently unpredictable, he agreed with his companion, national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft, as they fished the waters off Bush's vacation home in Kennebunkport. The two men know enough history to understand that blundering, not brilliance, is the norm of generalship; that scared soldiers shoot down their own planes. "Surgical strikes" are usually anything but. In a raid on Iraq, what military planners euphemistically refer to as "collateral damage" could include hundreds of American hostages.

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creepy charade by telling his "guests"—some grim-faced British schoolchildren—that they are not really "human shields" after all. Smiling like an undertaker, Saddam assured the children—the same ones he had threatened to starve the week before—that they are "heroes of peace." Then he gathered their families for a cozy little group picture. "Sick beyond expression," said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. On Saturday, Saddam continued to bluster that war would leave "columns of dead bodies." Still, he made no move to take over the foreign embassies in Kuwait that he had ordered shut down, and U.S. officials saw "glimmers" that the Iraqi strongman was looking for a negotiated end to the crisis.

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Ordinary Americans, too, seemed reluctant to engage in the sort of mawkish hand-wringing that made the country seem like a pathetic giant during the 1980 Iran hostage crisis. "Tie a yellow ribbon 'round... your mouth," growled everyman columnist Mike Royko. So far, Americans are supportive of Bush: A NEWSWEEK Poll showed that 75 percent approved of his handling of the crisis (below). Bush believes that the Vietnam syndrome has passed, that Americans are no longer afraid to exercise force. Indeed, having spent more than \$2 trillion to build up the military over the past decade, many Americans want to use it. But doubters are sure to be heard, especially when Congress reconvenes after Labor Day. "It's one thing to have support for deployment. It's another to have support for combat casualties," warns Lee Hamilton, a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Grand strategists, especially the ones who do their plotting in libraries, see war in clinical terms. In earlier times, wars were regarded simply as "investment in, earn-

ings out," writes military historian John Keegan. No American president can seem so mercenary. Keeping down the price of oil is not sufficient reason to fight a war. Even if Saddam could dictate to OPEC, he would be constrained by market forces. Raise the price too high, and the West would turn to alternative fuels. In the short term, a war would just raise the price of oil higher by shutting down production facilities and panicking the spot oil market.

Nuclear threat: Earlier American presidents went to war to make the world safe for democracy. Restoring the Emir of Kuwait would be making the country safe for feudalism. A more noble goal, Bush reasons, is standing up to aggression through collective security. The president seeks to erect a permanent structure to stand not just against Saddam, but all power-hungry, land-grabbing military adventurers. Today's aggressor resides in the Middle East, but tomorrow's could be anywhere.

There is another strategic goal that has never been publicly stated by the administration, but in the end it is the most impor-

tant one. Saddam already has missiles tipped with warheads full of poison gas. Most experts believe that within five or seven years Saddam could have the capability to build nuclear weapons. Israel, the country Saddam has threatened to "burn," is already within range of his rockets. Eventually, Saddam may be able to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching, say, New York.

To knock out Saddam's nuclear- and missile-production facilities requires a war. The United States would win it, at a price. The Iraqi Army is not the Panama Defense Forces; it has a million men and 5,500 battle tanks. In the end Saddam's forces would succumb to the U.S. air power and ground forces massing around the gulf (page 22). Iraq is already exhausted by its eight-year war against Iran. Cut off from its main supplier, the Soviet Union, Saddam's Army would soon run out of spare parts and ammunition. The U.S. troops in the desert are volunteers, not draftees; many are highly trained by elite regiments. But like all soldiers in all wars, they are young and

Cautious Support

While Americans continue to back Bush's Middle East deployment, they want to give diplomacy more time and have mixed feelings about a hostage rescue that could cost thousands of lives.



CHARLES KRUPA—AP

Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Bush is handling the situation involving Iraq and Kuwait?

75% Approve 18% Disapprove

Should Bush quickly begin military action against Iraq or should he wait to see if economic and diplomatic sanctions are effective?

17% Begin action 80% Wait

If fighting begins, should President Bush order attacks on Iraqi positions even if U.S. hostages or other foreign nationals are being held at those positions?

57% Should order attacks 26% Should not

If the only way to rescue thousands of U.S. and other foreign hostages in Kuwait and Iraq is through a military action in which hundreds of other hostages and thousands of U.S. troops are killed, would you support or oppose such an operation?

9% Support 38% Oppose

Are the following countries doing as much as they can to help solve the crisis? (percent saying not doing enough)

3% Arab nations 59% Japan
% European nations 58% Soviet Union

Some people say the United States is in decline as a world power. Do you agree or disagree?

ree 37% Disagree 55%

Do you think President Bush is spending too much time on vacation during the current crisis or not?

38% Yes 55% No

If the United States initiates military action against Iraq, will it cause very serious problems for the United States throughout the Arab world, somewhat serious problems, not too serious problems or no problems at all?

29% Very serious 18% Not too serious
42% Somewhat serious 8% No problems

Which of the following should be among the goals for U.S. forces and which should not?

	SHOULD BE A GOAL	SHOULD NOT
Rescuing as many hostages as possible	92%	7%
Forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait	84%	10%
Restoring the former government of Kuwait	70%	20%
Destroying Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons and military capabilities	78%	17%
Removing Saddam Hussein's government from power in Iraq	73%	19%

For this NEWSWEEK Poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed a national sample of 767 adults by telephone August 23-24. The margin of error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. Some "Don't know" and other responses not shown. The NEWSWEEK Poll © 1990 by NEWSWEEK, Inc.



SCOTT APPLEWHITE—DOD POOL

An F-15 Eagle skims the Saudi desert in a training exercise aimed partly at reminding the Iraqis of America's superior air power

scared. For every professional killer, there is a boy who joined the Marines to see the world and get a college loan, not to die in the desert. In World War II, writes historian Paul Fussell, the most common cry of the mortally wounded was "Mother!" If that cry is not heard again in future tank battles, it will only be because of the muffling of a gas mask.

An Arab jihad? Assuming military victory, the United States would still have to ask what it had won. There is no "good guy" waiting in the wings to take over from Saddam—not even the sort of dubious allies the United States suffered in Vietnam, a Thieu or a Ky. The Iraqi generals who might overthrow their leader could be just as fanatical. After World War II, the Allies were able to expunge Nazism from Germany. But they can hardly expect to rid Iraq of Islamic extremism. What is more, a martyred Saddam might turn a territorial war with the United States into a Pan-Arab jihad against the Great Satan. Unable to drive out the infidels, poor young Arabs in other nations might turn instead on the moderate Arab leaders who supported Washington, however tentatively. In Jordan King Hussein would likely be toppled and in Egypt President Hosni Mubarak might fall as well.

Bush is loath to demolish the coalition he has worked so hard to create. He is justifiably proud of his diplomatic achievement: even Libya's Muammar Kaddafi has denounced Saddam's hostage taking. To shore up collective security, to make the U.N. Security Council a force for peace and not just a debating society, the United States must appear patient, law-abiding and peace-loving. If it cynically uses inter-

national support as a cover for a unilateral invasion, say Bush's advisers, who would trust Washington again?

But if the United States does not move against Saddam, what assurance is there that this grand coalition will last? State Department officials talk of "the fast-fold strategy." Rather than wait for the long-term squeeze of sanctions, they want Saddam to believe that Bush is itching to use force, and right away. Yet implicit in the fast-fold approach is the recognition that if Saddam does not cave in soon, he gains an advantage. The American people might not be willing to pay for a long-term Pax Americana in the desert at a time when the federal deficit is hemorrhaging. The embargo could spring leaks as less resolute nations cut separate deals with Baghdad. The United States could be stranded in the

desert, a neocolonialist power propping up wealthy sheiks.

Ultimately, then, Bush may have to go to war. Yes, the region could be aroused into fundamentalist fury. On the other hand, that was the fear after Reagan bombed Libya in 1986, and the great anti-American uprising never happened. Kaddafi just crawled back into his tent. To guarantee that Saddam never uses an arsenal that grows more frightening by the day, it may ultimately be necessary to destroy both the Iraqi strongman and his capacity to make war. There may be no guarantee that Saddam's successors would be more reasonable men. But at least they wouldn't have nuclear weapons.

EVAN THOMAS with ANN MCDANIEL and THOMAS M. DEFRAK in Kennebunkport and JOHN BARRY, MARGARET GARRARD WARNER and DOUGLAS WALLER in Washington

A U.S. freighter carries landing craft that would be used in an invasion of Kuwait

DEREK HUDSON—SYGMA





PHOTO BY DENNIS BRACK—DOD/AFM

With U.S. forces still thin on the ground in Saudi Arabia, members of the 82nd Airborne Division set their mortar in position

What to Expect in a War

It would pit Iraq's troop strength against America's high-tech air power


If war breaks out with Iraq, Americans will win it in the air or lose it on the ground. So far, the Iraqis have a huge numerical advantage in men, artillery and tanks. The Americans and their allies cannot stop them with ground forces alone, especially if the Iraqis attack in the next few weeks, while the U.S. buildup is still underway. Instead, the Americans will have to rely on air power to knock out the Iraqis' tanks and prevent Saddam Hussein from fully bringing his forces to bear. Ironically, this is precisely the kind of war that U.S. troops have spent the last 40 years preparing to fight. But they expected to fight it in Western Europe, fending off an invasion by the tank-heavy armies of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Now that the cold war seems to be over, the battle that may never be fought on the north German plain could be waged, sometime in the next few weeks or months, on a Mideastern desert.

Iraq's Army is almost a Warsaw Pact force, equipped mainly with Soviet weapons and schooled in Soviet tactics. Its attack is spearheaded by Soviet T-72 and T-62 tanks. To clear a path, artillery batteries are fired by self-propelled 122-mm and 152-mm Soviet-model guns. Air de-

fense is provided by mobile batteries of Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and radar-controlled ZSU-23 antiaircraft guns. If it comes to a fight, the Americans ought to win; the war might even turn into a rout. Although the Iraqis are good by Arab standards, they're no Russians. Most of their tanks are obsolete. Their Navy is almost nonexistent. Their Air Force, though large, is not equipped for the swift-kill missile war of modern air combat

**CRISIS
IN THE
GULF**

Cheney negotiated new bases next door



and probably cannot deny the Americans control of the air for even a few days.

Still, a war with Iraq probably would be no walkover for the Americans. It could involve as many as three difficult and risky phases (chart, page 28). A pitched battle on the coastal plain of Saudi Arabia would test the theory

that warplanes can defeat tanks, something that not even the Israelis have ever done on such a grand scale. An attempt to liberate Kuwait City would entail what a senior Israeli military man describes as "tough, murderous combat." And in an air war over Iraq itself, American pilots would have to dodge dense groundfire—wondering all the while whether Western hostages were at risk on the targets below.

The Americans are not yet ready to fight, if they have any choice in the matter. The buildup has been running behind schedule. Two weeks ago Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelley, the director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was described by a well-placed source as "close to dismay" over the slippage in the timetable. The Pentagon's top priority was to put combat aircraft into Saudi Arabia as a first line of defense against an Iraqi inva-

sion. But deploying the support personnel and equipment for air operations took more time and more airlift capability than anyone had anticipated. Saudi airfields were swamped by the flood of American men and equipment. That was why Defense Secretary Dick Cheney returned to the region last week, negotiating a bases agreement with the neighboring United Arab Emirates.

Because of the emphasis on deploying air power, there was a delay in delivering ground forces, whose heavy armor would in any event have to travel by ship. The Marine Corps may have saved the day. It had equipment, including about 100 tanks, prepositioned on supply ships in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Because the Marines were able to deploy with their tanks more rapidly than the Army, 45,000 of them were ordered to Saudi Arabia.

A kick for Saddam: The Marines' tanks are relatively old M-60 models—still good, but not top of the American line. As long as Army units with new M1 tanks are unavailable, the force in Saudi Arabia is going to be relatively thin on armor. That, in turn, prevents the force from carrying out all of its potential assignments. The Americans appear strong enough to hold Saudi Arabia. "We have the ability now to kick Saddam all the way back up north," Prince Turki bin Nasser, the Saudi commander of a major air base, boasted last week. U.S. forces may even be capable of mounting a successful assault on Kuwait City. But they are not strong enough to take all of Kuwait and hold it indefinitely without heavy air support. And while U.S. planes are committed to tank-busting, an air war over Iraq itself cannot be sustained at the level of intensity that planners know they will need to smash Iraq's air defenses.

The answer is to get more tanks to Saudi Arabia, freeing some of the air power for missions deep inside Iraq. Equipment for two brigades of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division is expected to arrive at the end of this week, beefing up the force somewhat. And Pentagon officials say the First Cavalry Division, stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, has been alerted for duty in the Mideast. Among other weapons, the First Cavalry has 232 M1 tanks. It will take until the end of September to get the division to Saudi Arabia by sea, and the troops will not be battle ready until October.

By then the United States will have 140,000 to 150,000 military personnel on the ground in Saudi Arabia and a total of more than 200,000 in the region, counting those on warships. There will be about 300 U.S. aircraft in Saudi Arabia and 300 more offshore, including at least 28 giant B-52 bombers currently based on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. With that much force deployed, all of George Bush's military options will be open to him.

How to Stop a Tank

Iraq has 5,500 tanks in 10 armored and mechanized divisions. In a ground war, U.S. troops would have three highly efficient antitank weapons at their disposal:



LEIF SKOOGFORS—WOODFIN CAMP

■ TOW MISSILES

The tube-launched, optically tracked Wire command-link guided missile is highly accurate. Soldiers can steer it after firing via a trailing wire—so long as they keep the target in the cross hairs.



MI SEITELMAN—PHOTO CONSORTIUM

■ A10 AIRPLANE

Called the Thunderbolt II, a slow-moving attack plane built to take punishment. It's armed with as many as eight types of antitank weaponry, from Maverick missiles to armor-piercing bullets.



LEIF SKOOGFORS—WOODFIN CAMP

■ M1 TANK

The Chrysler-designed M1 tank is the top U.S. antitank machine. Heavily armored, the powerful gas-turbine engine exceeds 42 mph. It fires armor-piercing and high-explosive ammo.

And military experts predict that sometime before the end of the year, the president will make a decision on putting the forces to use.

Saddam Hussein could beat him to the punch by invading Saudi Arabia. Cheney said last week the Iraqis had 160,000 to 200,000 men and 1,000 tanks "poised on the northern border of Saudi Arabia." But Saddam has deployed his troops, for the moment at least, in defensive positions, guarding the border and coastline of Kuwait. "He is expecting the American Navy and Marines," said a top Saudi intelligence officer. On their side of the border with Kuwait, the Saudis also had a thin line of armor, with the main defenses farther back. Most American forces were 100 miles or more to the rear, defending military bases and other built-up areas. They were gradually extending the range of their operations, with the Marines and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division steadily moving farther into the desert.

The Iraqi troops are more suited to defense than attack. Under a complicated formula it uses to evaluate the combat potential of armies around the world, the Pentagon ranks the offensive ability of an Iraqi armored division at less than half that of a U.S. division. On defense, the Iraqis do a bit better. During their eight-year war with Iran, their greatest victories were achieved when dug-in Iraqi troops mowed down ragtag Iranian attackers.

Four feet tall: Saddam has a tough, dedicated officer corps. He tends to execute the officers who fail him or appear to be disloyal. "What you have left," says a congressional-staff expert, "are the true believers." The enlisted men are less impressive. Iraq has only 18 million people, of whom about 3.5 million are rebellious Kurds. As a result, the million-strong armed forces include "a lot of old men and boys," says Thomas McNaugher, a Brookings Institution expert on Mideast armies. Of the 600,000 or so Army regulars, fewer than half are combat veterans of the war with Iran. "Iraqi forces are not 10 feet tall," says Anthony Cordesman, an expert on the Iraqi Army and national-security assistant to Sen. John McCain. "They're about four feet tall. But remember, two four-footers can still take down a six-foot man."

The strongest part of Iraq's Army is now stationed far to the front; of its 10 armored divisions, three or four are positioned in Kuwait, with a similar number deployed in southern Iraq. If Saddam decides to attack before the American force reaches peak strength, his tanks would advance toward Saudi Arabia's key military bases and oil fields, turning the coastal plain into a killing ground. U.S. ground troops would fight back with Apache helicopter gunships and TOW antitank missiles. The

(Continued on page 30)


Should War Come: A Scenario


What will happen if President Bush does order a strike against Iraq? Most experts say U.S. forces would be hard pressed to launch an offensive until early October—there simply aren't enough troops and matériel in the region. But some envision a quick U.S. strike that would play on America's strength in the air. Here is one speculative scenario, culled from interviews with sources in the military, the administration and the analyst community. Precise locations of forces have not been released.



1 Hold Saudi Arabia

Iraq is not likely to invade Saudi Arabia at this point, thanks to the continuing U.S. buildup. But American forces would still have to pin down the four Iraqi divisions now dug in along the Saudi border to keep them from going on the offensive. F-15s would take control of the skies quickly (Iraqi pilots are neither trained nor equipped for dog-fighting), then a broad array of American attack planes would bomb Iraqi divisions and destroy fuel and ammunition supplies. British-made Tornado planes would seed the desert with mines.






2 Take Kuwait City

This operation would begin with special-forces commandos sneaking into Kuwait's capital to neutralize Iraqi command posts, opening the way for paratroopers with air support. The special forces would search out hostages, while other soldiers quelled the Iraqi forces and cleared the port for more arrivals. By seizing the al Matla Ridge outside town, American troops would gain high ground to defend against further attack.

3 Paralyze Iraq

Three objectives remain. First: to prevent reinforcements from reaching Kuwait. Second: to scatter the Iraqi Army, destroying airfields, air defenses and Scud-B missile sites. Radiation-seeking missiles would hit radar and broadcast communications; nuclear reactors and weapons plants might be left for later. Third: to cut power and communications in Baghdad, plunging the city into darkness and shaking the people's faith in Saddam.



The Embassy Standoff

Iraq added to its hostage count by barring Western diplomats from leaving Baghdad while carrying out its threat to cut supplies to embassies in Kuwait. Iraq shut off water and power to U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Howell and his remaining staff.



STEPHANIE MCGEE—AP; STATE DEPARTMENT

(Continued from page 25)

82nd Airborne has limited quantities of the up-to-date TOW-2A and larger quantities of older models, which may or may not be effective, depending on whether the Iraqis have installed the latest armor on their Soviet-built tanks.

High profile: The Marines' M-60 tanks would join the fray, along with any Army M1s that arrive in time. Though outnumbered, the American tanks would have one advantage. In the desert, tanks often fire from defensive positions scooped out by bulldozers; they poke their noses over the top, fire at the enemy and then retreat into their giant foxholes. The American tanks have taller turrets than their Soviet counterparts. This higher "profile" might be a disadvantage on the smooth German plain, but in the desert it's a plus, because it enables the Americans to depress their gun barrels to a greater degree than the Soviet tanks can manage. As a result, U.S. tanks have to expose less of themselves when they rise up and bring their guns to bear.

None of that would be enough to stop the Iraqis, especially if Saddam strikes before more U.S. tanks reach Saudi Arabia. The

job would have to be done by air power. U.S. F-15s would establish control of the skies. F-16s would fire HARM missiles, which lock onto radar signals, to knock out Iraq's mobile ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns. British Tornado attack planes based in Saudi Arabia would sow minefields from the air to channel Iraqi tanks into killing zones. U.S. A-10s, A-6s and F-16s would take on the tanks. The B-52s also might come into play, dropping enormous bomb loads onto Iraqi tank formations. If the attack planes can fly enough sorties—say, an average of two per day—they will stop the tank attack. If the sortie rate is significantly reduced—by sandstorms or poison-gas attacks on air bases—the battle on the coastal plain could become frighteningly close.

One unpredictable factor is Iraq's arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles. There were unconfirmed reports last week that Saddam had moved Soviet-made Scud-Bs into Kuwait. The missiles are inaccurate, better suited to random bombardment of large cities than to precise attacks on military targets. If the Scuds can be equipped with chemical warheads, however, they might well intimidate U.S. and

Saudi troops. "Heck, I can face the Iraqis any time, but poison gas just scares me to death," a U.S. paratrooper said last week.

If the current stalemate turns into a shooting war, the second objective of U.S. forces would be to take Kuwait City. The attack might begin with the insertion of commandos, such as Navy SEALs or Army Green Berets, to neutralize Iraqi command posts. U.S. strike aircraft, including the F-117A Stealth plane, would try to knock out air defenses. Paratroopers, quickly supported by helicopter-borne troops, would seize the airport and clear the harbor for a Marine amphibious landing. The attackers would try to rescue foreigners trapped in Kuwait City, running the risk that some of them might die in the cross-fire. But the immediate military objective would be to hold the city. For that purpose, troops supported by attack helicopters and fighter-bombers would try to take and hold al Matla, a key ridge northwest of the city.

To prevent a successful Iraqi counterattack, U.S. planes would strike at three major airfields outside Kuwait City. "These airstrips would be taken out before lunch," says Donald Kerr of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. Five airfields in southern Iraq, clustered around the city of Basra, also would be hit. And U.S. planes would attack supply lines running from Iraq to Kuwait. "That would be our No. 1 target," says an American official in Saudi Arabia. "We must take out all the tea, sugar and replacement stocks being fed to the Iraqi frontline soldier." The Iraqis would try to fend off the air assault with surface-to-air missiles that have been deployed in the region. "You're going to lose some planes, that's for sure," says an Israeli expert. "But if the pilots can read the SAMs, they will manage to cut the road and keep it cut." The Americans also might use some special weapons, such as B-52s or the big guns of the battleship Wisconsin.

Air raids: U.S. warplanes will swarm all over Iraq. Their initial objective: to sweep Iraq's Air Force from the skies, knock out its air defense and Scud missile sites, cripple its military command-and-control apparatus and stop the reinforcement of Saddam's southern front. Iraq has some good anti-aircraft guns and SAMs, including Moscow's advanced SA-14. But most of the anti-aircraft units are of poor quality. The crews that serve in them are thought to be badly trained, and the Iraqis have never had to cope with the electronic countermeasures employed by U.S. planes.

Once the Americans control the sky, they will have a long list of military-industrial targets to choose from. Iraq's chemical-warfare facilities, including the key production center at Samarra, north of Baghdad, would be a top priority, as would the biological-warfare research center at Salman Pak, southeast of the capital. Less urgent but

equally important are nuclear facilities, atomic weapons, and the production of the Osiris, which was designed in 1981. The walls thought thick, but the U.S. warplane

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equally important targets would be Iraq's nuclear facilities, which are working on atomic weapons but are five years away from producing them. Iraq is trying to rebuild the Osirak reactor near Baghdad, which was destroyed by Israeli warplanes in 1981. The facility is now protected by walls thought to be more than three feet thick, but the reactor has not been fired up. U.S. warplanes would probably hit Osirak

and similar facilities, and they would try to find giant underground nuclear facilities that Iraq may be building. Israeli officials say that if their country gets involved in the war, it also might attack Osirak and would probably bomb missile bases in western Iraq whose launchers are within range of Tel Aviv.

American officials believe, however, that some of the most effective attacks their

warplanes can undertake might be those aimed at electrical power plants and civilian radio and television stations. Cutting off TV, radio and electricity would bring home to the Iraqi people the sobering fact that Saddam Hussein has led them into a war he cannot win.

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN BARRY and DOUGLAS WALLER in Washington, RAY WILKINSON in Saudi Arabia and THEODORE STANGER in Jerusalem



JACQUES LANGEVIN—SYGMA

One commander predicts 'lethality [that] will overshadow Vietnam' if fighting breaks out

With the Marines: 'We'll Stop Them Here'

Forward-based U.S. Marines would probably be the first troops to engage an invading Iraqi Army. NEWSWEEK's Ray Wilkinson, a former Marine in Vietnam, spent two days on the front lines and filed this report:

The Marine infantry unit is dug snugly into an abandoned rock quarry. Camouflaged Amtracs—awesomely noisy troop carriers—storm a hillcock in a mock attack. Mortar and tank units hold nighttime exercises to familiarize themselves with the terrain. Combat units outfitted in cumbersome chemical-warfare suits struggle up and down sand dunes in 120-degree daylight temperatures. Inside the suits the temperature is 10 to 20 degrees hotter. "You see that highway over there," says Marine Col. Carl Fulford. "That's the main highway from Kuwait. If the Iraqis at-

tack it will be down that road and we will stop them here." Colonel Fulford predicts it would be bloody: "The lethality of the battlefield in a single day here will overshadow the whole Vietnam War."

The Marines, renowned in Vietnam for their almost perverse pleasure in making do with the most obsolete military equipment, are equipped in this campaign with the latest high-tech weaponry. TPQ radar locks onto incoming shells and missiles and instantly plots their origin and target. Marine LAVs (light armored vehicles) play hide-and-seek in the sand dunes, from behind which they can raise a "spotting platform," locate attacking tanks and fire a battery of lethal anti-tank TOW missiles. New "smart" shells called Copperheads are guided to enemy tanks by laser beams. None of this comes cheaply. Each

Copperhead costs \$34,000.

The Marines are supremely confident. "Iraqi tanks will die when they come up against us," says tank commander Lt. Col. Buster Diggs. Colonel Fulford says his greatest weapon is the individual Marine: "As long as you pour water down their throats, they are formidable fighting weapons." The Marines themselves are more laconic. "Man, that Saddam Hussein, he's messing up my life," one lance corporal groans. "We want to get this over with. We want to help Saddam Hussein make up his mind. And if we don't go after him now, we'll have to go after him later."

The Marines and other grunts are backed up by a formidable logistics network. At an air base in eastern Saudi Arabia, giant C-5 and C-141 transport planes and commandeered civilian aircraft

land around the clock. American F-15 and Saudi Tornado fighter jets scream overhead. While lines of Black Hawk troop-carrier helicopters and Apache attack choppers dance in the distance, columns of camouflaged Marine M-60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and double-decker buses clog the airstrip.

Servicemen who just two weeks ago arrived tired and jittery now sound primed for action. Air crews flying reconnaissance missions sound jaunty, almost cocky. "If the Iraqis start shooting," says one crew chief of an F-15 fighter squadron, "then the sky is going to be full of Iraqi bodies." Commanders work hard to keep the deployment businesslike. "There's no rah, rah, rah here," says Col. Ron Rokosz, commander of the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment. "We have a job to do. And we will do it."

Initial fears of friction with the Saudis have receded. Chaplains who were instructed not to wear crosses in an Army pamphlet of "do's and don'ts" pin them back on and hold discreet religious services. Female soldiers strip to their T-shirts—when no Saudi men are around. Some units still face major disruptions because female soldiers can't drive in Saudi Arabia. "Sure I'm having problems," says one Air Force sergeant from California. "I can't walk anywhere without a male escort. I can't wear shorts and I can't go downtown to buy a pizza." And, perhaps a prank, a well-heeled Saudi businessman offered a half million dollars for one blond female officer. The officer politely declined—and got back to work.



LUC DELAHAYE—SIPA

A Marine from the 7th Expeditionary Brigade practices sighting his gun in the desert

Advice From a Desert Warrior

A retired Israeli general says 'train, train, train'

BY AVIGDOR KAHALANI

For a fighting man, the desert is both friend and foe. In regular terrain, you can see maybe a mile at most. But when you are steering 50 tons of lethal metal tank across desert sands, you can see forever. So, unfortunately, can the enemy.

That's why the desert breeds decision makers. A split second can make the difference between life and death, as I well know. In the Six Day War in 1967 my tank took a direct hit from the Egyptians near El Arish. I was at the turret as it slammed into us. It felt as though somebody had plunged a giant knife in my back. The tank became a brazier, and even the treads were on fire. My deputy commander died, and so did the loader. The blow knocked me back inside the tank compartment. As I burned, I tried three times to jump out. Finally, I succeeded in getting out and into a sand dune. Ironically, this time the desert helped save me, as I covered my naked body with the plentiful sand. Eventually, I made my way to another of our tanks, and they took me back for treatment. I was burned over 60 percent of my body, but I lived, even though I had to undergo 16 operations in all.

I never met a tank commander who didn't prefer open desert spaces. In the 1967 and 1973 wars, it gave us more options. There, you can fire your missiles and artillery to their maximum range and see

them actually hit. You can take a fix and adjust your fire. You can maneuver to your heart's content. On the Golan Heights, for example, you have to worry about hitting roads or fields. In the desert you create the road as you go. For the military purist, the desert is the perfect laboratory.

What's truly unique about the desert, from a warrior's perspective, is how "clean" the terrain is. You can identify the enemy more quickly than in a European-type environment. Sometimes that's good, and sometimes that works against you. In the desert, you can run, but you can't hide. You're always exposed, and therefore you're always on duty. And during wartime, it's nothing but overtime.

We have an expression in the Israeli Army, "When it's raining on you, it's raining on the enemy as well." It means simply the other guy has to face the same conditions. During the Six Day War, the Egyptians had to face the same problems we did. The American GIs should keep that in mind as they stare down the Iraqis. In the desert, everybody can be a John Wayne as long as you have good training. Practice is the key. There are no superior Jewish genetics or Iraqi genetics in the desert. How many rounds you can load and shoot in how many minutes is a question of experience. It's probably true the Iraqi forces in Kuwait are better trained than the Egyptians who

faced us in 1967. My advice to the American troops in Saudi Arabia is simply this: don't waste valuable time on just getting comfortable; sleep six hours a day; drink plenty of water and use every other minute for training, training, training.

Personally, I don't think the intense desert heat is the big problem some people make out. Maybe I'm just a desert rat by heredity (my people immigrated to Israel from Yemen). Tanks have fans, and more modern ones, like the American Abrams tank, are even air-conditioned. The Abrams will do fine in desert conditions. The important thing for foot soldiers to remember is to drink lots of water. As for tank crews, let's face it, most of the time you are so scared that you don't even think about the heat.

An army has to work like a cohesive unit in the desert, or it will be smashed. A lone-wolf tank commander in the desert is soon a dead wolf. If he's smart, he will use his air cover and other intelligence systems for a read on where the enemy is. You have to use your air force and artillery to open some clean spaces in the enemy's lines and go from there. Without good intelligence, the desert becomes a maze—a deadly maze.

Defending your desert positions is the hardest, sweatiest work of all. Since the desert offers few natural defenses in the way of rivers and forests, the American troops will have to make their own, as we did in the Sinai campaigns. You have to get out there with bulldozers to improve on nature by building trenches and barriers and laying mines in valleys.

Fighting in the desert, surrounded by nothingness, a man runs the risk of losing sight of why he's there, except to survive. A soldier's motivation becomes doubly important. I believe the U.S. officers in Saudi Arabia should take the time now to sit with their men, to explain goals, to know every soldier personally, to give them the feeling they are the

best, that their mission is a must. Leadership is at a premium in the desert, and without that nothing will be achieved.

I nearly died out there, but I don't hold it against the desert. Whenever I have a chance, especially when it's hot and muggy and congested in Tel Aviv, I head for the open spaces of the Negev. The desert is a beautiful place to rest. But I can never forget it's also a killing field.

Avigdor Kahalani, 46, a retired brigadier general, led the Israeli charge into the Sinai desert in 1967. His Patton tank was the first to cross the Egyptian border. He was sidelined by a direct hit but he recovered to fight again in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. He has written two books about his battlefield experiences. One of them, "The Heights of Courage," was translated into English.

**CRISIS
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Reveille for the Reserves

A test for the new part-time military

Boston police SWAT-team leader Deputy Edward Eager brought home a map of the Middle East to show his wife and daughter where he might be going. Clifton Ymematsu, a California shopping-mall designer, told his boss he might not be in. Al Beverly, commanding officer of a Reserve intelligence unit, faced an unusual dilemma: he had planned to spend the next few months campaigning as the GOP nominee for Georgia's seventh congressional seat. All across the country, a cross section of the citizenry waited anxiously to hear if they would be among the nearly 50,000 reservists called to active duty in the coming weeks. Many also braced for what their particular role in the Middle East would mean. Air Force Reserve Capt. Sue Barry, a Chicago trauma nurse, bluntly describes her specialty handling severe casualties as "plug 'em up, plug 'em in and keep 'em alive as best we can." If her unit is activated, she says, the wounds they would see "will be our worst nightmare."

They've been called "weekend warriors" and the military's "second string." In fact, Reserve and National Guard troops now play such a crucial part in the U.S. armed forces that President Bush had no choice but to call them in. Ever since the United States committed to an all-volunteer army in 1973, the Pentagon has relied more and more heavily on reservists, part of what's called the Total Force Policy. The reasons are mostly budgetary: maintaining a reservist costs on average \$5,000 a year, compared with \$30,000 for an active-duty soldier.

The Pentagon has relegated many critical support specialties to the part-time forces. Reserve and National Guard units now make up 67 percent of the Army's truck companies, 65 percent of its chemical-decontamination experts and 100 percent of its water-purification and distribution personnel. They account for 93 percent of the Navy's cargo-handling battalions and 59 percent of the Air Force's tactical airlift capability. "We can't even do an extended police action without using certain skills in the Reserves," says former assistant Defense secretary Lawrence Korb. "They simply don't exist in the active force."



CHUCK NACKE—PICTURE GROUP

The 347th General Hospital unit in California receives instructions

Some military analysts question the wisdom of that policy. Active-duty officers, in particular, view reservists as too ill trained, ill equipped and cumbersome to mobilize rapidly. In truth, readiness has improved considerably from the days when they mostly played poker on weekend tours and drilled with hand-me-down weaponry. Some now train with Army troops in the Mojave Desert; some have joined Operation Bright Star in the Mideast. Reserve pilots also routinely beat out Air Force regulars in flying competitions. Still, some experts have misgivings. "You get what you pay for," says Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution, which warned last year that relying on reservists, particularly for front-line duties, poses risks to national security.

Pentagon officials said the reservists now being activated are those in support, not combat, positions. Among the first were six airlift wings, trained to fly C-141B Starlifters and giant C-5A Galaxies. Some of those pilots have already flown volunteer missions to Saudi Arabia since the Iraqi crisis began. More than half of the Army reservists will handle food, fuel, water and surface transportation in the gulf. Many of the medical personnel, meanwhile, will replace active-duty doctors and nurses shipped out from stateside military hospitals. The prospect of treating veterans and officers' families on the home front actually rankled some reserve doctors as they contemplated severe losses in income. "I believe in what Kennedy said about asking what you can do for your country, but I don't want to go into a stateside hospital just to save the budget," grumbled Gerald

Dreher, a Texas orthopedic surgeon who commands the Army Reserve's 491st Medical Clearing Company.

Yet that was the bargain reservists struck when they signed on as standby soldiers. While some did so out of patriotism, many were motivated by the extra income they could earn serving one weekend a month and two weeks each summer, all at active-duty daily pay rates. During a long-term call-up, the shift from civilian to military pay can mean financial hardship.

"It's a heck of a pay cut," said Robert Morales, a Miami-area police officer with a newborn at home. Even so, officers at the U.S. Army Reserve Command in suburban Chicago were fielding 150 calls a day from men and women eager to sign up.

Having to mobilize so many citizen-soldiers, so fast, was also the risk the Pentagon took when it opted for the Total Force. How well the reservists fare will play a major role in determining the future size and shape of the U.S. armed forces. With the prospect of war with the Soviets now diminished, some experts think the Pentagon can rely even more on part-timers. Others argue for a leaner, more rounded active force that would not require reservists in key support roles. But planning for the next war is always difficult; already, the conflict with Iraq seems likely to be the kind of massive, drawn-out mobilization the Pentagon once envisioned fighting with the Warsaw Pact. The wisdom of saving money by putting reservists at risk is just one of the many questions at stake in the sands of Saudi Arabia.

MELINDA BECK with MARK MILLER
in Washington and bureau reports

**CRISIS
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The Necessity of Dissent

Why raising questions can help clarify U.S. goals

By JONATHAN ALTER

How often in recent weeks has the American public read something like the following?

Saddam Hussein may be a brutal aggressor, but no one could blame him for invading Iraq in 1990. In fact, the United States and many other countries tacitly supported him in that war. Why is invading Kuwait so much worse? After all, it was a part of Iraq until earlier this century. It is at least as much in Iraq's sphere of influence as, say, Panama is in ours. Moreover, the Kuwaitis did seem to be "sant-drilling"—stealing oil—from Iraq. And the emir we're committed to restoring to the throne—Marine by dead Marine—is rumored to have sticky fingers. How about the Saudis? Princes among men. They have been known to execute young women for having sex outside marriage. Saudi Arabia has one of the most undemocratic regimes anywhere. Why should American soldiers die in the name of cut-rate oil? And why shouldn't the Arab masses resent our presence? It's immoral to shed so much blood just to make the world safe for rich sheikhs and gas guzzlers.

Obviously there's a lot missing from that analysis. The logic can be picked apart from here to Baghdad. But one of the remarkable things about recent weeks is how infrequently the above arguments have even been raised. Publicly, the drumbeat is almost uninterrupted. Yes, this conflict may be necessary for the future of the world. But everything about it should be questioned. In fact, the more convincing the case for intervention, the stronger the counterarguments must be. That way, any war will be grounded in true democratic debate.

How scarce is mainstream dissent? Last week the father of a U.S. Marine wrote a critical piece in *The New York Times*. "If American diplomacy hadn't been on vacation for the better part of a decade, we wouldn't be in the spot we are in now. If, as I expect, you [Bush] eventually order American soldiers to attack

Iraq, then it is God who will have to forgive you. I will not." The author, Alex Malin, was besieged by requests for TV appearances to explain his novel views. No one had heard them before.

There's some token antiwar sentiment showing up in newspapers in the Midwest, which is once again slightly less interventionist than other regions. And polls show that black Americans, who would do a disproportionate share of the dying as well as suffer most from the



Any war should be grounded in true democratic debate

AP/WIDEWORLD

inevitable economic consequences at home, are less supportive than the population as a whole.

But that still leaves a deafening silence. Where have all the liberals gone? Even Jesse Jackson was supportive, at least at first. Actually, liberal support for military commitment conforms to an old historical pattern. Only in the last 25 years have liberals tended to argue against foreign intervention. In both world wars and Korea, liberals were early idealistic supporters. Vietnam began as a liberal adventure. The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized intervention, was opposed by only two members of a heavily Democratic Congress.

Indelible events: Traditionally, it has been not liberals but radicals and isolationist Republicans who have most loudly opposed military involvement, though their protests were more tolerated before wars than during them. Again, the gulf crisis, shorn of ideological coloration, is reverting to this historical pattern, with

left-wingers like Ramsey Clark and right-wingers like Pat Buchanan raising most of the questions. Still, the dissent level even among polemicists is comparatively low. Consider the climate before the United States entered World War I, when many Americans thought that unarmed ships was not provocation enough. In the early stages of World War II, even the fall of France to the Nazis did not obliterate American isolationism. In both cases, it took more than two years and considerable debate before the American public grudgingly moved to war. Without Pearl Harbor, it might never have happened at all.

These are the indelible events that conditioned Navy fighter pilot George Bush, who understandably hopes to avoid a contemporary version of such paralyzing doubts. But in this case, more spirited debate seems necessary, and not just because of the speed with which the nation has been thrust from peace toward war. The wars that condition today's youth are not World War II or even Vietnam, but Grenada and Panama. Both were short and relatively painless, just like Rambo. While most young Americans realize that a gulf war would be longer and tougher, they lack the personal experience of wartime sacrifice necessary to make that idea more than an abstraction.

The Vietnam trauma must have truly faded, for the assumption once again is that the United States cannot lose. This notion was shared by a group of Washington, D.C., socialites who set out on a festive summer picnic to watch Union troops smash some Rebels at a place called Bull Run. It didn't turn out quite that way in 1861; it rarely does. A "jingo" is an old British war song that sounds better if sung sober. When dissent does come, as it inevitably will when Congress returns, Bush may be compelled to state the logic of intervention more clearly. The best reason has nothing to do with oil or Kuwait or defending "our way of life" in Saudi Arabia. The real issue is Iraq's bid to join the nuclear club, and whether the world will bar the door now or later, when the cost could be even steeper. Will weapons of mass destruction be allowed to lie in the hands of dictators who may use them? That's a true matter of global interest, a question to be debated vigorously and rationally, free of the fever of war.



PHOTOS BY DAVID TURNLEY—DETROIT FREE PRESS—BLACK STAR

training with the 'Popular Army' (left), a bread line usual in the city's Saadoun Street shopping district



Newspeak in Iraq rivals anything from the dark years of Eastern Europe. Western hostages are now known as special guests, when they are dragged off to bombing targets, or "guests" when they are merely prohibited from leaving the country. Iraq is a signatory to international conventions prohibiting hostage-taking, but a word change is all it takes. It is difficult to talk politely to Iraqis about Kuwait, since the following words are forbidden: invasion, takeover or occupation. "Fusion" is the currently acceptable term. "You said taking Kuwait?" Dr. S. al-Tikriti, a member of the puppet National Assembly, scolded a loose-talking journalist. "This is not correct. Kuwait is a part of Iraq, so how could we take Kuwait?"

Muddled thought: Muddled talk makes for muddled thought. The Iraqis say President Bush was nervous last week, while

coincidence that they were all jostling in front of a bakery at 5 a.m.

Now the line is that the U.N. boycott is starving Iraq and depriving children of milk. Raad Saadoun, a shopkeeper in downtown Baghdad, recently denounced the Americans for the milk shortage, even as he was busy selling baby formula to customers. "How can you do this to little babies?" he said. Cases of powdered milk

and formula were stacked at his feet. The truth is that there is no milk shortage, and the boycott provides for humanitarian distribution of essential food if needed. Similarly, medicine is still allowed to be sent to Iraq, despite Saddam's claim last week to the contrary. In a totalitarian society, truth is whatever the leader says it is.

Taken a step further, it's not reality that's important, it's what you say about it.

Saddam was calm. When Bush announced that he was releasing 5 million barrels of oil from strategic reserves, an Iraqi official smirked. "Five million barrels [actually, 3.5 million] is the output of Iraq in a single day," he said—conveniently forgetting that since the embargo, Iraq's output doesn't count.

Ultimately, totalitarian regimes entangle themselves in their own deceptions.

"There's nothing to suggest that we're heading anywhere but war," said one Western diplomat in Baghdad. Iraq has made no visible civil-defense preparations, even after the Air Force's chief of staff disclosed the likelihood of massive bombing strikes. To do so, the regime would have to admit to its people what it has only just begun to admit to itself. The line, repeated by every Iraqi one meets, is still that America wouldn't dare. "The U.S. has no right to attack us," truck driver Kareem Sethan, 32, said last week, "and there is no danger that it will." While the Iraqis occupy themselves with barking at the sky, "much of the diplomatic community is busy looking for a place to hide when the bombing starts," said a Western diplomat. He recently spent three days clearing out his cellar at home. If the bombs do fall, few Iraqis will be as ready as he is.



PATRICK AVENTURIER—GAMMA-LIAISON

'Any method': Abul Abbas

ligence sources. Most worrisome is Abu Nidal, whose command structure moved there last April. Abu Ibrahim, whose May 15 Organization specializes in airplane bombs, has also been in town, say Western diplomats. Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was greeted like a head of state when he decamped from Damascus. His group has planted bombs on Israeli buses. For the first time, Abbas openly acknowledges his Baghdad base.

And he is unrepentant. Challenged about his most famous victim, the American Leon Klinghoffer, shot and shoved off the Achille Lauro in a wheelchair, he demanded: "Can you name one Palestinian killed by the Israelis?"

"Yes," said his visitor, and did. The Palestinian was probably killed intentionally, Abbas replied, but "Klinghoffer was killed by mistake... The main goal was to arrive at Palestine, but the operation failed."

Visiting Abbas involved a furtive meeting at a hotel, a stop at a downtown office to be checked, and a short, escorted ride to his headquarters in a residential neighborhood. Half a dozen guards toting AK-47s patrolled the halls and yard. But Abbas bristled at any suggestion that he must hide out from American authorities, who nearly captured him in Italy after the Achille Lauro affair. "I never feel as if I am wanted," he said. "I feel as if they are wanted."

ROD NORDLAND in Baghdad with DOUGLAS WALLER in Washington



ROD NORDLAND—NEWSWEEK

'Guests': American hostages in Baghdad watch the leader on TV in their hotel room

'Try Not to Hit This House'

A hard life in hiding from Saddam's soldiers

Somewhere in Baghdad, in the relative safety of a house in a diplomatic compound, 24 American men have evaded capture by the Iraqis for the past 40 days. One day last week, Tom Graham, 40, an engineer from Amarillo, Texas, fed his cats; he enticed them over the wall from the shabby neighborhood outside by offering roughly what he himself has: "decent meals and a safe haven." Jack, a rigging supervisor from Montana, led a group of the men in his daily exercise class in Royal Canadian Air Force calisthenics. Roy, a middle-aged construction worker, was sitting in his Wagoneer in the driveway, racing the engine. He wasn't going anywhere soon. "Charging the battery," he explained. "Gotta be ready for anything."

Most of these hostages, and others like them scattered around Iraq and occupied Kuwait, say they see only one way for help to come: U.S. military intervention. "I don't want to die, I have too many things I want to do, too many places I want to go," said Jack, who, like many of the hostages, asked that his last name not be used. "But if Mr. Bush allows 20,000 expatriates to direct his decisions, then he's not taking care of business." Graham, who would have finished his two-year tour in Iraq on Sept. 27, had the same message for his two daughters when he managed to get a brief call through to the States: "I told them not to allow me to become the issue. The issue is Kuwait." Graham had been working in

Iran when the shah fell, and narrowly missed being taken hostage there—escaping the turbulent country in disguise in a bus. "History has taught us that to subjugate issues to a hostage situation just precipitates more hostage-taking," he said.

This is not a viewpoint that a hostage comes by easily. The men in the safe house fully expect the Iraqis to come over the compound's walls the moment the bombers fly. They're worried, too, that they might be bombed themselves. "It's difficult to say this, but ultimately intervention is the best option," Graham said. He had a simple message to U.S. troops if they do attack: "Be decisive and be expedient—and try not to hit this house." Jack is in an especially awkward position: his son is a U.S. Army chopper pilot and may well be in Saudi Arabia now. "This guy Saddam is wrong and something has to be done about it," he said. "Don't get me wrong. I want to see the [Los Angeles] Rams play their next home game in person. But if there's a bomb with my name on it, there's nothing I can do about it." The men in the safe house do their best to fight boredom by organizing chores to keep the crowded house clean, listening to news bulletins and watching videotapes. Their favorite: "Top Gun," which Jack has seen 12 times already.

They are actually some of the luckier ones among the 1,000 Americans trapped in Iraq and Kuwait—all of them in effect hostages, whether or not in official custody.

With the arrest last week of a man in Kuwait, the total number in actual Iraqi custody rose to 101 men, apparently scattered out among strategic military sites around the country. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has compiled a list of 63 American men who are ill, but the Iraqis have refused to let them go. Three are so seriously ill that they cannot be treated in Iraq, U.S. officials say. One is losing his eyesight from a diabetic complication. Another has had a triple heart-bypass operation and needs sophisticated monitoring. The third has a spinal affliction that requires a powerful painkiller not available here.

'Inept bullying': Last week the Iraqi Foreign Ministry sent a diplomatic note to Western em-

bassies warning of the Revolutionary Command Council's decree that anyone harboring a foreigner in Iraq could be hanged as a spy. The note then demanded that diplomats present for registration any foreigners on their compounds. An outraged U.S. diplomat in Baghdad termed the note "more inept bullying and a flagrant violation of the Geneva conventions... We're not going to offer an American citizen to go into detention." Iraq later said it would take no action against embassies sheltering civilians.

Still, the note caused alarm among the two dozen men at the safe house when they heard about it on a 7 a.m. Voice of America newscast. "It's an emotional roller coaster," said Jack. "It's like going to a bad play and not being able to leave." The Iraqi demand reminded Eugene, a 45-year-old construction supervisor from Orange County, Calif., of the day the hostages heard a radio announcement that the Iraqis would let women and children go. They phoned Iraqi authorities, who said their husbands would have to accompany them to get the exit visas. "They were tricked into it," Gene said. The women got out; their husbands disappeared into custody. "That really brought [us] down," he said. "It was our first indication... that these guys are not fooling around."

Despite their own ordeal, many of the hostages appear most worried about those at home. "Sometimes at 12 o'clock at night I find myself sitting in the dark with tears down my eyes," said Graham. "But it's worse for our friends and loved ones in the States. I'm sure they're doing laps in a squirrel cage." "We're glad that at least the women and children got out," said Gene. "We'll just have to wait and see how this plays out."

ROD NORDLAND in Baghdad

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'The Staunchest Ally'

Thatcher on the gulf crisis and the 'special relationship' between the United States and Britain

When the Persian Gulf crisis erupted last August, coincidence put British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a strategic spot—in Aspen, Colo., at a conference also attended by President Bush. Britain was the first Western nation to join the United States in pledging to send military forces to the gulf. In a one-hour interview at 10 Downing Street last week, Mrs. Thatcher spoke with NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL Editor Kenneth Auchincloss and London bureau chief Daniel Pedersen. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: What is your forecast for the gulf crisis—war, compromise or stalemate?

THATCHER: I am not in the business of forecasting. I am in the business of keeping people's eyes on the main objective—which is that aggression must not pay. Therefore, Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait and the legitimate government must be restored. That is in the United Nations resolutions. It is not negotiable. In order to achieve that, we have first to make sanctions bite; and secondly we have to continue to increase the amount of defense we have there so that we have enough people to do whatever is required.

There has been talk of a "new world order." What has the gulf crisis taught us?

A "new world order" is one of those vague phrases. I think what [the Bush administration] meant was that they were very pleased indeed to see the United Nations acting together, the five Permanent Members in particular and then to get the motions through the Security Council so firmly as we have done... [The concept] carries one very important implication, that you have to be prepared for whatever may happen because otherwise when it happens it will be too late to be prepared. And then you have to make regional arrangements with the consent of the countries [in the region]. NATO is such a regional arrangement and... you will have to make a regional arrangement in the Middle East. But in the end, some of us will have to carry out the role that we have carried out for years, having forces ready to deploy out of area, whatever area is the base organization, for the simple reason that we have always been used to playing a world role. Great trading nations... will always have to protect supply routes.

How worried are you about an international romanticism of the type that developed after World

War I, that argues that war can be rendered obsolete with the right kind of security structure?

That is not the lesson of history... armaments are not the cause of war. The cause of war is when some ambitious country gets very strong and the [others] still rely on idealism... Idealism is not a deterrent. There is no euphoria that will stop an aggressor... That is the ultimate signifi-



TERRY O'NEILL

Strength over idealism: The prime minister

cance of what has happened in the gulf. If we fail now, then we have ceased to learn the lesson of this century and we would go into the next one not safer but less safe.

What has the crisis told us about the European Community's ability to formulate a common foreign or military policy?

It teaches us what we know. The European Community is not a security organization. NATO is. [The EC] has the foreign-policy cooperation, but when it comes to

taking the practical steps, then you rely on the few countries which have been used to acting in that way... The others came along, but more slowly.

How much sympathy do you have for the German argument that they are constitutionally prevented from taking military action on the gulf crisis?

I think that after they are unified they will have to consider whether they should modify that. After all, Germany has not got a drop of oil. Germany relies on supply lines for many of her raw materials and she is a very successful industrial country.

The argument could remain that even with a new operating mode for NATO, a nation-state will always react more swiftly to something like the gulf crisis than any collective group.

There would be considerable validity in [that argument]. If it comes to using words, an organization can react very quickly. Within 24 hours of Iraqi soldiers invading Kuwait, the United Nations was called together, totally condemned the invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal... When it comes to [sending] troops... I think you will find that the nation-state, or a group of us, would probably act more quickly—and there are times when speed is vital. And speed was pretty important this time because there was a fear, justified in my view, that Saddam Hussein could have gone over very quickly into the north of Saudi Arabia and then, of course, quickly down the smaller states in the gulf. So it does not mean that each of us as a sovereign state has no defense duty—we have—but to your national-defense duty you add alliance duties. The best and most powerful one the world has ever known is undoubtedly NATO. Whether we could build up other ones as powerful remains to be seen.

It has been fashionable to think of the United States as a declining power, at least in some U.S. quarters. What is your view?

The United States is the world's most powerful nation. It is a free-enterprise nation based on freedom and justice, and that particular kind of philosophy which informed people who went there in the first place: They went there for liberty. They went there to pioneer. They went there to build opportunity, they went there to be free and they went there with pretty firm moral commitments. And in a way those

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who went there were self-selected because they wanted opportunity. They were prepared to work, they were enterprising. [The United States] will continue to be what we would call the nation of last resort, the nation whom you can always rely on to be free [and] enterprising.

When the Iraq crisis broke, you by chance were in Aspen with President Bush. Did you find yourselves instantly of a single mind about this crisis?

Oh, yes indeed, which is not surprising because we have held the same views and had similar experience and are of a similar generation.

This spring, when it was fashionable to write that you were finished politically, it was also fashionable to conclude that the so-called special relationship between the United States and Britain had ended, too.

Please do not go any further. I am not responsible for what you write. You are.

Can you simply characterize what the gulf crisis has done to your relationship with President Bush?

I think it has just confirmed what I hope in their hearts most American people knew—that we were always the staunchest of allies. When the United States went into Panama I thought it was absolutely right, and said so, and was really rather horrified that other people did not say the same. I think it confirmed what was always there.

Do you ever use the words "special relationship," or is that a journalistic horror?

Well, yes it is [a special relationship]. Because the Magna Charta belongs as much to you as it does to us; the writ of habeas corpus belongs as much to you as it does to us . . . There is such a common heritage as well as the language. Shakespeare belongs as much to you as he does to us. The rule of law, the development of the common law . . . the fact that democracy is about more than majority voting. It is about justice and a rule of law; it is about certain human rights which no government can displace because they did not come from government . . . That is what unites us and has united us—rather more than a philosophy, but history as well, and language and mode of thought . . . the basic things [we share] are the enlarging of freedom backed up by a rule of law, backed up by economic liberty because political liberty and philosophical liberty will not last long without economic liberty. [This] has been longer in our psyche, I think, than in anyone else's . . . When you are dealing with Europe, it is nothing like the same length of time: [Democracy in] Germany [is only] in the postwar period; France [has had] one form of government, one government, after another . . . So it is this historic thing which is in the bloodstream [of Britain and the United States]. It is in the bones as well as in the mind. ■



United front: Baker and Shevardnadze vote for the Security Council's air embargo

Talking Peace and Moving Toward War

At the U.N., a plan to authorize the use of force

In a display of unity that would have been unimaginable even a year ago, the United Nations Security Council passed its ninth anti-Iraq resolution last week. The latest one, Resolution 670, was enacted while Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze presided over the Security Council, and it was opposed only by Cuba, one of the world's last unrepentantly communist countries. The measure imposed an air embargo on Iraq, tightening the economic blockade and condemning once more Saddam Hussein's brutal occupation of Kuwait. There may be still more resolutions ahead, restating the world body's almost unanimous disapproval of Iraqi aggression. But the United Nations has just about run out of ways to punish Saddam by peaceful means. To go beyond sanctions and finger-wagging, it will have to agree on a way to initiate—or at least authorize—military action against Iraq.

If the Persian Gulf stalemate turns into a war, the Bush administration would rather wrap itself in the United Nations flag than fight Saddam on its own say-so. NEWSWEEK has learned that U.S. officials are drafting a Security Council resolution that would au-

thorize military action against Iraq. The draft, still in very rough form, may not be acted upon for another month or more, and its wording could change many times. But the basic idea, sources say, would be to sanction military action without requiring the United States, or any other combatant, to put its forces under U.N. command.

The question of a collective military response to Iraqi aggression was discussed at length last week at a private dinner given by Secretary of State James Baker for foreign ministers of the so-called Group of Seven, the world's richest nations (the others: Japan, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada). "Bush and Baker would rather not go to hostilities, but if they must, then they want to go into it as cleanly as possible," says a senior U.S. official. "They want to have as many forces on the ground as we can get and as much international approval as we can muster." The draft resolution could muster all the approval Bush needs. "By passing this resolution," says another U.S. source, "we would be playing at once our last diplomatic card and our first military one."

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Still, there is no sign that Iraq wants to negotiate. "If Saddam were shopping for, or trying to peddle, some diplomatic way out, this week offered him a perfect chance to test the market," a U.S. official said at the United Nations. "But all we heard was more threats from Baghdad." Saddam warned that if the sanctions delivered "a sanguinary blow" to Iraq, it would "strangle all those who are the cause of this," including Saudi Arabia and Israel. And in a videotaped message to Americans, he warned that a U.S. war with Iraq would be "repeating the Vietnam experience, only this time... [with] more casualties."

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French President François Mitterrand said that negotiations could begin if Iraq merely declared "its intention" to get out of Kuwait and to free foreign hostages. Although Mitterrand didn't deviate all that much from U.S. policy, he seemed to offer Saddam a concession—and reason to hope for more. Rhetoric more to Washington's liking came from Shevardnadze, who denounced Saddam more vehemently than ever and warned: "War may break out in the gulf any day, any moment." Soviet officials said their policy hadn't changed. "We must do everything possible to avoid a war," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov. But by talking tough, Shevardnadze had hardened the Soviet line, which Washington found helpful.

An 'early war option': The administration expressed some belligerent sentiments of its own. After the exiled Emir of Kuwait visited the White House and described Iraq's efforts to dismantle his country, Bush vowed again: "Iraq will fail." His national-security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said that "what's happening inside Kuwait affects the timetable" for choosing between military action and a diplomatic solution. Rep. Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, suggested that the administration "is looking more favorably on an early war option." Aspin said U.S. intelligence had found evidence that Iraq is developing biological weapons, including one capable of spreading the usually fatal disease anthrax, and that such weapons might be ready for use by the end of the year (NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27).

If the administration decides to fight, it

would prefer to do so under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, which permits the Security Council to authorize collective action. The resolution being drafted by U.S. officials would call upon members to *coordinate* their efforts to repel Iraqi aggression, thereby placing military action under U.N. auspices and finessing the thorny issue of command. "The beauty of it is, if we do this right, the operation could fly a U.N. flag, which could bring the Soviets, the Europeans, a lot of the Arab countries and many of the non-aligned on board," says a U.S. official. U.N. endorsement of military action clearly matters to many Americans and to many other nations. "If the U.N. Security Council decides on that, we will have no objection," Turkish President Turgut Ozal told NEWSWEEK. Many details remain to be settled. One key U.S. ally proposes, for example, that the United Nations issue an ultimatum giving Saddam a precise deadline after which military action can be initiated with the Security Council's blessing.

It is by no means certain that the Security Council will authorize military action. China, with its veto in the council, could be a major stumbling block; the Soviets, who also have a veto, and some of the Europeans are at the least unenthusiastic about using force. But at the United Nations last week there was a widespread sense of foreboding, a feeling that armed conflict—under U.N. auspices or none at all—was on the way and that, in the end, war may be harder to avoid than peace is to embrace.

MARGARET GARRARD WARNER and RUSSELL WATSON in New York with THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington and bureau reports

Listen Up Good

Yo, Marines! Homesick? Forget about it. Bored? No way. Your commandant won't allow it. Gen. Alfred Gray dropped in on the troops in Saudi Arabia last week and delivered a homily with all the eloquence of a boot-camp D.I. "I don't want to hear any more questions about how long you are gonna be here," he barked. "We're gonna be here till we get done what has to be done, right?" (The men agreed.) "There'll be no morale problems in the First Green Expeditionary Force, right?" he went on. "That's because I say there'll be morale." And there was. Following Douglas MacArthur's advice that the "unfailing formula" for morale is "appreciation from without," Gray told the Marines that even if the mission took six months or more, they had "won a big one already" simply by being there, in harm's way.



TANNEN MAURY—AP

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